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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) began as a worldwide phenomenon in the 19th and early 20
th
 
centuries. Even then, it formed only a small portion of foreign investments for decades, as a 
greater percentage took the form of portfolio investments.
1
 This was the case for example in 
1914, when 90% of all foreign investment flows took the form of portfolio investment.
2
 Over 
time, however, there was a steady shift in the composition of foreign investments. In fact, about a 
quarter of foreign investment flows took the form of FDI in the 1920s. The drop in portfolio 
investments came about as a result of the collapse of the world monetary system in the 1930s, 
provoked by World War 1 and the Great Depression. There was, however, a general drop in the 
two types of investment during the interwar years. Unlike portfolio investment, FDI proved 
amazingly resilient and gradually recovered in the late 1930s. FDI again improved with the end 
of the Second World War, and became even more prominent after the 1960s in developing 
countries.
3
 This was not the case, however, which was yet to have its share of FDI flows.  
At the end of colonialism, Cameroon like other former colonies of France and Britain depended 
on the legislation received from their colonial masters as a means of attracting foreign 
investments into the country. Taking advantage of some provisions of the Treaty of Rome, which 
favoured overseas colonies, it engaged in trade relations with its former colonial masters, Britain 
and France.
4
 
 When Cameroon attained independence in 1960, it enacted its first investment code with the aim 
of attracting investment needed for economic growth.  Two decades later, the said investment 
                                                          
1Hooshang A and Weiping W „FDI in Developing Countries‟ (1994) 28 The Journal of Developing Areas 167 190. 
2
Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment (2004) 8-9 describes portfolio investments as being 
characterised by the movement of money for the purpose of buying shares in a company formed or functioning in 
another country  
3Hooshang A and Weiping W „FDI in Developing Countries‟ (1994) 28 The Journal of Developing Areas 167 190. 
4Hallstein W „Treaty establishing the European Community as Amended by Subsequent Treaties Rome‟ 25 March 
1957 available at www. hri.org/MFA/foreign/treaties/Rome 57.BH343.txt  (accessed 20 October  2011). 
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code had to be revised because it had become obsolete as a result of the changing global 
economy. The code no longer responded to the needs of the state, thus compelling the drafting of 
a second investment code on 4 July 1984.
5
 Both investment codes were unfortunately flawed, 
with irregularities that needed amendment.
6
  
 Generally, investment flows from one country to another take pace through Multi-National 
Corporations (MNCs), which have been acclaimed over the years as the primary channel for 
transmitting FDI to developing countries. As stated by Kenneth Mwenda, there have been deep 
searches for a better understanding of both the causes and consequences of the rapid growth of 
FDI for the home countries, host countries, the international economy and the political order.
7
 
 The flow of FDI between countries and regions is assisted by bilateral, regional and multilateral 
agreements. Desiring to ensure the peaceful growth and development of its economy, Cameroon 
became an active member of several regional and economic organisations, amongst which are 
the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), and the Central 
African and Economic Community (CEMAC). Attracting investment is the main objective of 
many regional agreements. Thus the reason for Cameroon‟s membership of regional and 
economic organisations, and especially those mentioned above, is to seek larger markets, greater 
competition and improved policy credibility, all of which will boost incentives for investment.  
The main focus of this study is to investigate why Cameroon lags behind other developing 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in terms of attracting FDI in spite of its membership of, 
and participation in, bilateral, regional and multilateral trade and investment treaties, and its 
attractive investment policies. The above argument applies explicitly to FDI because Regional 
Integration Agreements (RIAs) are said to boost FDI inflows from non-member countries.
8
 
                                                          
5Ngwasiri C „The effect of Legislation on Foreign Investment-The Case of Cameroon‟ (1989) 33 Journal of African 
Law 192 204. 
6
 Ndiva K „Investment Codes as Instruments of Economic Policy: Cameroon Case Study‟ (1991) 25 International 
Lawyer 821 852. 
7
 Mwenda K „Legal Aspects of FDI in Zambia‟ (1999) 6 Murdoch University  Electronic Journal of Law  4 
8
 Wolf M „Regional Integration Agreements‟ Financial Times 28 October 1996 available at 
http:www.unige.ch/ses/ecopo/demelo/Cdrom/RIA/Readings/sw_ch1pdf (accessed 19 October 20  2011) 
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It is universally acknowledged that a well-designed policy framework for investment, capable of 
attracting FDI, would be productive and successful.
9
 Thus, for Cameroon to be competitive in 
attracting FDI, it is obliged to review its investment policies which continue to face the 
challenges of a changing global economy.  
FDI is indispensible for both developed and developing countries, since a country cannot grow 
without engaging in domestic and foreign trade.
10
 Noting that FDI is primarily for developmental 
purposes, the latter
11
 are more in need of FDI than the former. It is on this premise that 
Cameroon is constantly amending its investment codes to woo foreign investors. However, 
despite the enactment of several investment laws, it is yet to attract FDI significantly. Various 
reasons have been advanced as possible causes of low FDI inflows; one of these is based on the 
legal regulatory framework of the legal system.  It is necessary to ensure the regulation of FDI in 
a manner that is protective of home- based or home- grown industries. In this regard the paper 
analysis the Cameroon investment regulations and its investment climate in attracting FDI. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The research seeks to examine the concept of FDI as applicable to Cameroon with the following 
objectives in view: 
  To assess the impact of FDI on the Cameroonian economy. 
 To examine the role of regional and international organisations in promoting FDI policies 
in Cameroon. 
 To examine the current Cameroon investment code with regard to attracting investors and 
to make recommendations as to how to improve the code to attract more FDI. 
  
                                                          
9Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development‟s (OECD) Publications „Policy Framework for 
Investment‟ OECD Council 2006 available at   www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/31/36671400.pdf (accessed 21 October 
2011).  
10
 MoranT, Graham E and Blömstrom M edsDoes FDI Promote Development? (2005) 375. 
11
 Developing countries 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The main question this research paper seeks to answer is: why has there been a continuous 
decline in FDI inflows into Cameroon despite its very attractive investment laws?  What are the 
factors affecting Cameroon‟s FDI regulatory mechanism? What lessons can Cameroon draw 
from other developing countries with similar status, but unlike Cameroon doing fairly well in 
terms of attracting FDI?  
 
 1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
The Cameroon government needs to understand that there is a problem with its corporate 
governance system and legal framework vis-à-vis its investment policies. In this regard, 
decisions taken concerning investors programme of investment should be diligent and in line 
within the legal frame work of the governing investment policies. Until this is effectively 
addressed, investors will be put off rather than attracted and Cameroon will continue to struggle 
in its efforts to attract foreign investment. If that were so, the inflow of FDI would be hampered, 
which would automatically hinder improvements in economic policies needed to enhance macro-
economic performance and attain the minimum growth rate required to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) set  for 2015 by the UN for developing countries.
12
 
 
 
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
FDI is a very broad topic that continues to cause debate on issues of macro and micro economics, 
international law, the regulatory system, as well political issues, just to name a few. This study 
                                                          
12Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development‟s (OECD) Publications „Policy Framework for 
Investment‟ OECD Council 2006 available at   www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/31/36671400.pdf (accessed 21 October 
2011).  
12
 MoranT, Graham E and Blömstrom M edsDoes FDI Promote Development? (2005) 375. 
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does not engage all the issues associated with FDI, but is limited to those related to how 
developing countries can attract FDI, through law and policy. In this respect, its main focus is on 
Cameroon‟s investment law since 1960, and the changes that have taken place to improve the 
system for greater results. In order to highlight the challenges faced by Cameroon in terms of 
attracting FDI, and to show how these can be addressed, a brief comparism is made between 
Cameroon and Gabon with regards to policy framework and policy implementation. This will 
help to identify a best practice that Cameroon can learn from Gabon in dealing with FDI issues.  
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Cameroon‟s underperformance in attracting FDI displays a lack of confidence in it by foreign 
investors. That Africa is popularly believed to be a risky zone for FDI
13
 conceals the complex 
diversity of economic performance, and the investment opportunities that individual countries, 
like Cameroon, are capable of offering. This research is significant in that it will attempt to 
reveal how Cameroon still has something to offer to foreign investors with its numerous natural 
resources. As regards policy making, note has been taken of the fact that there is a consistent 
desire on the part of Cameroon policy makers to attract FDI.
14
 The research result will be a tool 
for the government of Cameroon and other countries to apply to attract FDI. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
  
The research adopts a literature review approach. Emphasis will be placed on available literature 
on the subject, especially that related to Cameroon. Thus the research makes use of books, 
journal articles, news reports, etc. These are explored and critically analysed in order to ascertain 
the concept of FDI as applicable to Cameroon.   
                                                          
13
 Tawia S „Invest in Africa: A framework for rational Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa‟ London Business 
School;European Investment Fund June 16 2009 Working Paper  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1896024 
(accessed 2011)  
14
 Ndiva K „Investment Codes as Instruments of Economic Policy: A Cameroon Case Study‟ (1991)Law Journal 
Library ; 25  
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In addition, an analysis of factors other than investment regulations, affecting Cameroon‟s 
inability to attract FDI, is also undertaken by studying two MNCs presently established in 
Cameroon, DHL
15
 and MTN
16
. The rationale is that investment regulation may not be entirely 
responsible for Cameroon‟s under- performance in attracting FDI.  
 
 
1.8 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
 
The organisation of the work is as follows: the opening chapter introduces the back ground to the 
study, in which a brief description of the origin of FDI is given, followed by an equally brief case   
study of Cameroon. The study is limited to Cameroon and developing countries. This shall be 
carried out through a literature review approach with particular focus on literature on Cameroon 
relating to the subject. 
Chapter Two examines FDI in relation to its application in Cameroon followed by a discussion 
of how it is regulated in Cameroon. The various investment codes are briefly examined and the 
current 2002 investment charter analysed. The importance of FDI for the growth of the economy 
is also examined. 
 Chapter Three looks at the role of international and regional organisations in the promotion of 
FDI in Cameroon in particular and Africa in general.  This is done by critically looking at two 
regional organisations, CEMAC and OHADA with which Cameroon has earnestly involved 
itself since becoming a member of these organisations. Comparism between Cameroon and 
Gabon is undertaken, and Gabon‟s good record of FDI inflows is compared to that of Cameroon, 
though both countries belong to the same sub-region and regional economic organisations. The 
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of regionalism and investment.  
                                                          
15
 DHL is a courier service company and stands for the abbreviation of the surname of its three founders. D for 
Adrian Dalsey, H for Larry Hillblom and L for Robert Lynn   
16
 Mobile Telephone Network 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
In Chapter Four, an assessment of the activities of MNCs in Cameroon is carried out, with 
respect to both their successes and failures. This is done by means of a case study of two MNCs 
operating in Cameroon, DHL and MTN. These two MNCs are compared and reasons why one 
succeeds while the other does not explored. Finally some of the legal deterrents to foreign 
investors in Africa and possible solutions to these restraints are examined.  
Chapter Five gives general recommendations that Cameroon policy makers and other African 
countries faced with the same problem could consider, on methods and means by which a 
favourable investment climate can be created to attract investors. Furthermore, attention is drawn 
to the lessons which Cameroon can learn from countries like Gabon who succeed in attracting 
investors. There is also a final conclusion.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 THE CONCEPT OF FDI AS APPLICABLE IN CAMEROON 
 
 2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 FDI has long existed and is being utilised by most developing countries as a means to foster 
economic growth and development. Related issues involve investor/host-country relationships 
established through agreements on particular investment projects for economic development. In 
most developing countries FDI is regulated by law and policy to ensure sustainability of 
investment as well as to protect investors‟ interests. This chapter focuses on the legal 
development of FDI in Cameroon since independence. It analyses the advantages and the draw -
backs of the Cameroon legal system in promoting FDI and sustainability of investment as well as 
attracting FDI in Cameroon.  
To begin with, it is necessary to provide a working definition of FDI. Many scholars and 
international bodies have come up with varied definitions of FDI. According to Graham and 
Spaulding, FDI occurs when a company from one country makes a physical investment in 
another country.
17
 The direct investment in infrastructure, machinery and equipment is different 
from making a portfolio investment, which is considered as indirect investment.
18
 Moosa Imad 
defines FDI as a process by which residents of one country, (source country) acquire ownership 
of assets for the purpose of controlling the production, distribution or other activities of a firm in 
another country (the host country).
19
 In addition, other scholars have added that FDI involves the 
purchase of the physical assets or a significant portion of the ownership (stock/shares) of a 
company in another country to gain control and management of that firm.
20
  The latter definitions 
                                                          
17
 Graham P and Spaulding R „Understanding Foreign Direct Investment‟.  Going Global 18 June 2005 available at 
http://www.going-global.com/articles/understanding_foreign_direct_investment.htm (accessed 21 November 2011) 
18
 Graham P and Spaulding R „Understanding Foreign Direct Investment‟.  Going Global 18 June 2005 available at 
http://www.going-global.com/articles/understanding_foreign_direct_investment.htm (accessed 21 November 2011) 
19
Moosa I Foreign Direct Investment; Theory, Evidence and Practice (2002) 
20
 Richard J, Hunter J and Robert E ET AL „Legal Considerations in FDI‟ (2003) 28 Oklahoma City University Law 
Review 851-874 
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suggest that not all investors begin as starters or initiators of new projects in another country. 
Thus, it can be deduced from the definition of Graham and Spaulding that an FDI investment is 
one that establishes a new project for economic benefits, rather than purchasing an already 
existing interest. This is further articulated by Ngowi P, citing Bjorvatn, that FDI is an 
investment made to acquire a long term interest in a foreign enterprise with the purpose of 
having an effective voice in the management.
21
 
From an international perspective, different organisations have given varied definitions of FDI. 
The World Bank, for example, defines FDI as the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor.
22
 The Organisation of Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD) definition of FDI reflects on the objective of establishing a lasting interest 
by a resident enterprise (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is 
resident in a country other than the investor‟s. A lasting interest envisages the existence of a long 
term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise and a 
significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise.
23
   
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines FDI as an 
investment made to acquire a lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of 
the investor. The purpose of such acquisition is to gain an effective voice in the management of 
the enterprise.
24
 The International Monetary Fund‟s (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual defines 
FDI as an investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor, the investor‟s purpose being to have an effective voice 
in the management of the enterprise. The definitions of the last two organisations are similar and 
characteristic of having substantial control in the investment enterprise.  
From the above definitions, a recurrence of terms like, “control” and “controlling interest” 
emerges, which denotes that in FDI investors are concerned more with the nature of the interest 
                                                          
21
 Ngowi P „Investment entry modes in Tanzania: Types, Driving Forces and Implications, (2002) 3(1) Tanzanet 
Journal 1- 12 
22
 World Bank „FDI Net inflows (BoP Current US$) available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD (accessed 25 November)  
23
 OECDBenchmark definition of FDI: Fourth Edition available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/50/40193734.pdf (accessed 25 November 2011) 
24 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp? (accessed 23 November 2011) 
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and the duration of their interest. Thus where these desired interests are not available in a 
country, investors are not likely to invest there.  
What is peculiar to FDI, as can be seen in the definitions above, is that the investor‟s intention is 
to own a lasting control of assets and management in another country. This interest differs from 
portfolio investment which represents a movement of money for the purpose of buying shares in 
a company formed or functioning
25
 in another country and which does not require the physical 
presence of the investor. 
For the purpose of this study, the definition of FDI by Imad Moosa is considered the reference 
definition because it deals with the most relevant issues of FDI. It regards FDI as a process by 
which residents of one country (source country) acquire ownership of assets for the purpose of 
controlling the production, distribution and other activities of a firm in another country (the host 
country).
26
 This definition should be read together with an appreciation that such FDI could 
involve the starting of a new project as well as purchasing an interest in an already existing 
company or enterprise. 
It is important to note, however, that there is a slight limitation included in the World Bank‟s 
definition. The limitation stems from the fact that it regards FDI from a percentage perspective. 
It considers an investment to be FDI if it involves the purchase of at least 10percent of the 
shares. Thus, where several investors purchase less than 10percent of the shares of a in foreign 
company (ies), they are not considered as FDI inflows into the foreign country. 
     
 
2.1.1 Definition of Foreign Investor 
 
Cameroon‟s definition of an investor in its investment charter proves the government‟s 
commitment to encourage and support investors irrespective of whether they are locals or 
foreign, as long as investments are made within the territory. According to section 3 of Law n° 
2002/004 of 19 April 2002 instituting the Cameroon Investment Charter, “„investor‟ shall mean 
                                                          
 25
 Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment (2004) Cambridge University Press 7 
26
Moosa I Foreign Direct Investment; Theory, Evidence and Practice (2002)Palgrave Macmillan 1 London 
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any individual or corporate body of Cameroonian or foreign nationality, resident or non-resident, 
whose activity involves acquiring assets with a view to earning interest.”27 The definition 
adopted by the OECD is broader. It includes a group of related individuals, an incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprise, a public or private enterprise, a group of related enterprises, a 
government body, an estate, trust or other societal organization, or any combination of the 
above.
28
 
 
2.2 The Concept of FDI from a Universal Perspective 
 
FDI is a universal phenomenon which has been widely debated from international, regional, and 
national perspective by scholars and policy makers as to its context and applicability. There is 
much controversy surrounding this area of international law. With the emergence of 
globalisation theories and concepts, developing countries have been challenged to develop their 
economic conditions either through the process of demand and supply or by law. In this regard 
they will ensure the maintenance, improvement and perfection of their economic, political and 
social conditions, in a bid to attract FDI which is relevant for developing countries. The 
UNCTAD suggests that FDI is the largest source of finance for developing countries.
29
 
Considering the truth of the above statement, Africa is still to derive the benefits of FDI despite 
numerous efforts to attract it. It is important to note that many African countries are still lagging 
behind in developing a favourable business climate that is attractive to investors. 
 Regional integration has remained one of the main goals for Africa and its people. It is against 
this background that the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) was established in 1964. African 
governments have always seen regional integration as a conduit for achieving sustainable 
economic growth and development through larger markets which according to them would open 
the doors to FDI.
30
 Policy makers in SSA are becoming more and more convinced that FDI can 
be achieved and improved upon through regional integration which they now use as an 
                                                          
27
Cameroon, Law n° 2002/004 of 19th April  2002 instituting the investment charter 
28
OECD Benchmark definition of Foreign Direct Investment Fourth edition 2008 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/50/40193734.pdf (accessed 30 November 2011) 
29Asiedu E „On the Determinants of FDI to Developing Countries: Is Africa different‟ (2003) 30 World 
Development 107-19. 
30United Nations Economic Commission for Africa „Assessing Regional Integration in Africa‟ available at 
www.uneca.org/aria3/AR1A3_ENG.pdf (accesses 2 December 2011) 
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instrument in achieving this goal. This is premised on the fact that despite the poor economic 
performance in some countries of the region, the strengthening of trust, regional policy 
harmonisation, and joint infrastructure projects, can provide greater access to world markets. The 
idea behind all of these is that, good governance, security, the rule of law and trust will go a long 
way to enhance investor interest in a region.
31
 
An analysis of FDI inflows in SSA shows that Cameroon is below the Sub-Saharan average and 
also lowers than all low income countries. In the CEMAC region for example, Cameroon is one 
of many developing countries lagging behind in attracting FDI, whereas other countries, such as 
Gabon, have recently emerged in the region with great FDI inflows.
32
 “In Cameroon, FDI‟s 
[contribute] „between 25 and 28% of GDP, against 90% of GDP for countries like Gabon…‟”33 
From a national perspective, any country seeking to encourage economic development through 
FDI is expected to acknowledge the principle that the laws of the host nation should not 
discriminate against foreign investors.
34
  This is the case with the current investment law in 
Cameroon, where no discrimination is made between national and foreign investors, the purpose 
being not only to encourage foreign investment, but national investment as well. This is also 
called the National Treatment Principle under the WTO trade rules. 
To this effect, section 3 of the Investment Charter in Cameroon does not discriminate between a 
local investor and an investor of foreign nationality. They are all regarded equally and given the 
same status and privileges, even if the foreign investor is not resident in Cameroon. The National 
Treatment Principle is well respected in Cameroon vis ὰ vis foreign investors. 
In the Cameroonian context, the legal system, although comprehensive and slow
35
, remains, on 
the whole, workable, reliable and favourable to a greater extend towards foreign investors. 
                                                          
31Dupasquier C and Osakwe P „FDI in Africa: Performance, Challenges, and Responsibilities‟ (2006) 17 Journal of 
Asian Economics 241-60 
32Ajayi S „FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, Targets, Impact and Potential‟ 2006 African Economic Research 
Consortium.   
33African Bulletin, 2010, CEMAC Countries: FDI‟s Are Not Eternal. Available at  http://www.african-
bulletin.com/news/605-cemac-countries-fdis-are-not-eternal.html [Accessed on 28th January 2012]  
34Xiaolun S „How to promote FDI? The Regulatory and Institutional Environment for Attracting FDI‟ available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan006349.pdf  (accessed 2 December 2011)  
35
 It is well defined though takes long to be implemented when it is passed as was the case with the 2002 investment 
charter which was only implemented in 2009 and not completely till date since certain aspects of the code would 
only become fully operational in 2014 as stated in chapter Four of this work. There are lots of incentives 
incorporated in this charter, which makes it business friendly despite its short comings 
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Cameroon, while not without problems, remains one of the most economically and politically 
stable countries in Africa with the rule of law generally respected.
36
 This peaceful atmosphere 
which is supposed to attract FDI but does not do so will be examined in the latter part of this 
work.  
Section 15 of the Investment Charter states that the State shall adhere to the multilateral trade 
system, in particular, the agreements of the WTO and the other mechanisms for the 
development of international trade, as well as the agreements of the International Customs 
Organisation (ICO). According to section 16 of the Investment Charter, the State re-asserts the 
option of regional integration, in particular within the framework of CEMAC and the 
Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS). 
The inter-relationship between multi-lateral and regional rule tends to affect investment rules 
within a state as the effectiveness of the investment policies of the state is often made subject to 
international rules or laws. This has often to deal with investors‟ security. It is in this light that 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has often been instrumental in cases of dispute between 
member states, whether from regional groupings or from a multi-lateral perspective. This means 
that, if there is an overlap between the WTO, regional rules and State rules, the multi-lateral and 
regional rules will take precedence over national laws in settling disputes related to FDI.
37
 The 
Preamble to the Constitution of Cameroon guarantees respect for international treaties and 
conventions.      
Duly approved or ratified treaties and international agreements shall, following their 
publication, override national laws, provided the other party implements the said 
treaty or agreement
38
 
          
This acts as a security measure for FDI investors since the country has undertaken the initiative 
to uphold international law.
39
  
                                                          
36
 Duane E „Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Cameroon‟ (1983) 17 International Lawyer 489 506 
37
 Magda S „Multi-lateral Investment and Competition Rules in the WTO: an assessment‟ available at 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteit4v6n2a8_en.pdf  (accessed 5 December 2011)   
38
 Article 45 of the 1996  Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon  
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2.3 The Regulation of FDI in Cameroon 
 
The regulation of FDI in Cameroon is done through the executive, legislative and judiciary. The 
1996 Constitution provides for a powerful President who is elected for seven years. The judiciary 
and the legislature are controlled by the executive. The judiciary lacks independence and 
adequate resources. This makes the credibility of the government within its multi-lateral and 
regional circles not only limited but questionable as regards its capacity to maintain its trade and 
investment polices vis-à-vis private investors or prospective private investors.
40
  
While Cameroonian business laws on paper are clear, few foreign investors have 
come forward because implementation of those laws is problematic. Under the current 
judicial system, local and foreign investors have found it complicated and costly to 
enforce contract rights, protect property rights, obtain a fair and expeditious hearing 
before the courts or defend themselves against frivolous lawsuits. However, the 
recently implemented [OHADA] Treaty may foster improvements in the judiciary.
41
 
In the context of Cameroon investment law, an Investment Code is a policy document for the 
government targeting the regulation and promotion of investment in the country. The first of 
these was in 1960, followed by 1984, 1990 and lastly the 2002 Investment Charter. It does not 
have enforcement power but as stated below
42
, in the case of a dispute, the applicable laws will 
apply.
43
 
Investment codes are legal documents as well as guides for companies and individuals interested 
in investing in Cameroon. As would be expected of any road map, the code helps the prospective 
investor to navigate through complex  rules and regulations governing what is frequently referred 
to as “doing business” in that particular country. The code provides useful information on 
eligibility requirements for doing business in Cameroon.
44
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
39
 UNCTAD/ITE/11A/2003/4 „The Development Dimension of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making Perspectives‟ United 
Nations: New York and Geneva, 2003 available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20034_en.pdf (accessed 6 
December 2012) 
40Stiftung B „Cameroon Country Report‟ available at http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/87  (accessed 
6December 2011) 
41
 Central Intelligence Agency.  Cameroon Investment Guide. Available at 
http://www.aabf.org/cameroon_inv_guide.htm [Accessed on 6 February 2012] 
42
Chapter Two, Section 2.4.3 
43
Sunday K  and Bamou L „An Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Cameroon’( 2006 ) African 
Economic Research Consortium 
44
 Ndiva K „Investment Codes as instruments of Economic Policy: A Cameroon case study‟ (1991) 25 Law Journal 
Library  821-858 
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The most important component of an investment regime is the regulatory framework. In 
Cameroon, the regulatory and institutional framework for investment, from when it attained 
independence in 1960 to 2002, has been provided by the various investment codes.
45
 
 
2.4 The Regulatory Framework for FDI in Cameroon 
 
 More specifically, the idea of the charter was to provide an appropriate institutional 
and regulatory framework to guarantee the security of investments, provide support to 
investors, and ensure fair and prompt settlement of investment-related as well as 
commercial and industrial disputes. It is worth noting here that the charter is not a 
substitute for the investment code.
46
 
 
Though the regulatory and institutional framework for investment in Cameroon had been 
patterned by the previous investment codes that had existed in the country since 1960 till 
date, the applicable investment climate is dictated by the 2002 Investment Charter as it lays 
down the regulatory and institutional frame-work within which investment activities operate. 
The law establishing the Investment Charter of 2002 was defined in section 2. The 
government enacted Law No 2002/004 instituting the Cameroon Investment Charter and its 
scope after it became evident that the 1990 investment code could not obtain its desired 
objective. The state of Cameroon is the custodian of the legal system in Cameroon and 
therefore it will ensure the enactment, regulation and enforcement of laws. Section 8 of the 
2002 Investment Charter clearly emphasises the role of the state in protecting investors‟ 
interests in Cameroon. The regulation of FDI under the 2002 Charter is controlled by three 
regulatory institutions created by the Charter. These institutions are the Regulatory 
Competiveness Board (RCB), the Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) and the Export 
Promotion Agency (EPA). According to section 24, “any petition for redress from an 
investor of noncompliance with the provisions of this law and its implementation 
instruments shall first be forwarded to the regulation and competitiveness board.” The 
                                                          
45
 Sunday A and Bamou T „An Analysis of FDI flows to Cameroon‟ 2006 African Economic Research Consortium 
46
 Sunday A and Bamou T „An Analysis of FDI flows to Cameroon‟ 2006 African Economic Research Consortium 
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implementation of the Charter is enforced by the RCB which is charged with the 
responsibility of drafting the implementation strategy.47   
 
2.4.1The court structure 
 
The court structure in Cameroon is of a highly decentralised nature. The motivation for this 
decentralisation is the desire of policy makers to bring justice within the reach of the population. 
This explains the fact that, apart from the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction over the entire 
country, all other courts are located at various sub-divisional, divisional, and provincial levels in 
the country.
48
  There are two courts which deal with investment disputes: the Court of Appeal 
and the Court of First Instance. In the case where an investment dispute arises and one of the 
parties is not satisfied, he may, where necessary make use of the OHADA court of arbitration 
located in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. This however has its advantages and disadvantages. A 
disadvantage is the question of the costs is involved; while an advantage is that of a fair trial. 
This advantage springs from the fact that the issue of bias may be mitigated or reduced to a 
greater measure than in national courts. This is so because legal proceedings would be carried 
out in a neutral arena when either of the parties involved in the dispute would have the 
possibility of influencing the judgment.  
The current governing investment code will be examined in detail so as to determine if 
Cameroon‟s underperformance is the result of non-compliance by investors or non-enforcement 
by the state. 
 
2.4.2 Enforcement Strategies 
 
When all avenues for negotiating dispute settlements peacefully have been exhausted 
enforcement strategies are then employed. The present would be looking at how these 
                                                          
47
 Section 23(2) of 2002 Cameroon Investment Charter  
48
 Samuelson H „The Force of the Cameroon Legal System‟ available at http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=7156 
(accessed 9 Febuary 2012) 
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mechanisms are put into play. A foreign investor in this case is subject to the laws and 
regulations of the host country which in most cases is vastly different from that of the home 
country. In Cameroon however, the enforcement of investment laws are difficult to come by as 
the execution of judgement is slow and flawed with administrative bottle necks such as bribery, 
corruption and red tape measures. In such cases where rulings are difficult to enforce by local 
courts due to corruption, the foreign investor  may choose „arbitration by the international courts of 
justice and international arbitration centers according to Cameroonian law and the arbitration regimes of 
which Cameroon is a member.
49
 These arbitration regimes include the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes‟50 
 The Cameroon Investment Law therefore lacking in direct enforcement powers has given 
foreign investors rights of appeal to judgements against them on grounds that these were 
obtained against a back ground of frivolous lawsuits.  This is backed by its membership in the 
International Court of Justice and International arbitration centre from which it obtain it 
enforcement powers (indirect enforcement powers). Conscious of this limitation, the Cameroon 
government allied with the UN to come up with a governance reform programme in which are 
proposed measures to improve upon the status of the Cameroonian courts. This programme was 
approved in June 2000. This was duly applauded by the US Department of State in 2011 in its 
report stating that the Cameroonian law guarantees both foreign and local investors with property 
rights protection that comply with international standards and accords equal treatment between 
foreign and local firms.
51
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 Dickerson CM „The Cameroonian Experience under OHADA: Business Organisations in a Developing economy‟ 
(2007) 112 Business and Society Review 191 213  
50
The ICSID is one of the five international organisations that make up the World Bank Group. Like the other 
organisations in the group, ICSID is established by a multilateral treaty. In ICSID‟s case, this is the 1965 convention 
on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states, commonly called the ICSID 
convention. To date, 143 countries have signed and ratified the convention to become contracting states. The 
Convention offers them procedures for the conciliation arbitration of investment disputes they may have with 
individuals or companies that qualify as nationals of other contracting states.     
51
Thomson Reuters Foundation „Anti-Corruption Profile Cameroon‟ available at 
http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/country-profiles/good-governance  (accessed 14 January 2012) 
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  2.5. The Law Governing the 2002 Investment Charter   
The current law governing investment policies in Cameroon is law no 2002/004 of 19
th
 April 
2002. The scope of the above law is defined in its section 2, where, “in its determination to build 
a competitive and prosperous economy by boosting investment and savings, and attaining its 
economic and social objectives,”52 the pace is set for FDI by the Cameroon government. In 
anticipation of achieving these goals, a lot of attention is given to entrepreneurs, investors and 
private enterprises as important means to develop the economy and create wealth and 
employment.
53
  
 
Cameroon like most African states has been and is still in the process of creating an environment 
conducive to FDI since the early 1960s. Since then, legislations have been enacted with the aim 
of attracting FDI. It was believed then,
54
 and decades later,
55
 that these foreign investments 
                                                          
52
Section 2 of 2002 Cameroon Investment Charter  
44
 Section 2 of 2002 Cameroon Investment Charter
 
54
 This position was strongly endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly when it recommended, in 1954, 
“continuous efforts by both capital-exporting and capital importing countries …to stimulate the flow of private 
capital to the underdeveloped countries.” This resolution came out of the recognition that the “international flow of 
private investment for productive activities contributes to the raising of living standards by assisting in the 
development of natural resources, the expansion of and diversification of agricultural production and the growth of 
technical skills.” G. A. Res. 824, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 21) at 12, U.N. Doc.A/2890 (1954). A few years later the 
United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed its belief that private foreign investment was crucial to third world 
development when it designated the 1960s as the United Nations Development Decade and issued a plea to member- 
states to “pursue policies which will lead to an increase in the flow of development resources, [both] public and 
private, to developing countries on mutually acceptable terms.” G.A Res 1710, 16 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 
17, U.N. Doc A/5100 (1961). 
55
 In his 1989 New Year address, President Biya of Cameroon reiterated his government‟s commitment to enlist the 
help of foreign investors in the economic development of the country: “In order to increase our sphere of activity, 
we must continue to inspire confidence in foreign investors. To achieve this end, we have precious assets … We 
need a more attractive investment code; we are working at it.” Better days are ahead for us, Cameroon Tribune, Jan 
2 1990, at 2, col. 3. 
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would greatly contribute to economic growth and the advancement in technology required by the 
country to be competitive in the global economy.
56
 
The extent to which these investment laws and regulations have impacted on the flow of FDI into 
the host country is debatable. However, literature on the subject suggests that prospective 
“foreign investors see investment laws as an important barometer to measure the investment 
climate in a given country”.57 It is, therefore, not surprising that lawyers who counsel private 
foreign enterprises conclude that investment laws and policy influence investors in varying 
degrees in making the decision to invest in a particular country. Recognition of the importance of 
the investment codes has led to a spate of laws, reviews and analyses of this ever changing area 
of the law, as well as the publication of primers on the legal “dos” and “don‟ts” of doing 
business in one developing country or another.
58
 
„Investment codes are policy guide lines set by government to determine conditions for local and 
foreign investments in the country. These conditions are aimed at encouraging the participation 
of private investment in the Cameroon economy.‟59 
If foreign investors view investment codes as a condition for setting up their businesses in 
another country,
60
 then Cameroon‟s FDI regulatory and legal mechanism ultimately needs to be 
regularly amended to improve upon its inability to attract foreign investors. Policy makers in 
Cameroon are now aware of this short coming in the legal system and have had to amend the 
investment code thrice, expanding on the benefits available under the previous codes and 
discarding what is considered negative.
61
 The above suggests that a foreign investor will decide 
to establish his business outside of his home country only if he is attracted by very appealing 
investment conditions of that country, sufficiently favourable to him in terms of protecting his 
                                                          
56
 Ndiva K in his „Host-Nation Regulation and Incentives for Private Foreign Investment: A Comparative Analysis 
and Commentary‟ (1990) 15 International Law Journal 361-400 
57
 Ndiva K „Host-Nation Regulation and Incentives for Private Foreign Investment: A Comparative Analysis and 
Commentary‟ (1990) 15 International Law Journal 361-400 
58Ndiva K „Host-Nation Regulation and Incentives for Private Foreign Investment: A Comparative Analysis and 
Commentary‟ (1990) 15 International Law Journal 361-400 
59
 M Delancey, R Mbu and W Delancey „Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon‟ (2010)  
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legal interest and most certainly the percentage of profit he would be legally permitted to take 
home.  
This however is not a problem in Cameroon, as section 10 of the 2002 Investment Charter 
gives the foreign investor complete freedom to repatriate foreign capital invested, operating 
profits, as well as staff savings from salaries.  
Amongst others, these are the most pertinent aspects that would lure foreign investors to invest in 
Cameroon. To examine the current investment code with regards to its effectiveness, it would be 
pertinent to revisit the country‟s previous codes, and identify those legal aspects on which 
foreign investors lay emphasis on, and find out if those concerns have been addressed in the 
Cameroon investment code.  
 
2.6 The Historical Development of Investment Codes in Cameroon 
 
After Cameroon attained independence in 1960, the country was in dire need of market and 
technology for it abundant supply of raw materials. For fear of economic colonialism, having just 
merging from a period of colonialism, it came up with the its first investment code in 1960. 
  
2.6.1 The 1960 Investment code (Incentives) 
 
The driving force behind the promulgation of the 1960 investment code was the invitation and 
expansion of FDI in the country. To this effect, a number of incentives were provided by the 
government to promote investment by both local entrepreneurs and foreign investors.  
The 1960 Investment Code was designed to achieve a dual purpose; attract investment 
and assist in achieving the development objectives of the state. It offered four 
categories of incentives to business enterprises. (Schedules A, B, C and D) 
corresponding to the activities of sectors where the government wanted to attract 
investment. These incentives consisted in exemption from taxes and custom duties for 
periods between 5- 10years. Schedule „A‟ enterprises were allowed to import raw 
materials and capital goods duty free for up to 10years, and their indirect taxes on 
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finished goods for the first 3years of production were
62
 either reduced or simply 
cancelled.
63
 
The 1960 investment code offered lots of incentives to investors, as seen in the offer of 
exemption from paying royalties given to industries in the mining and timber industries 
under schedule A and B enterprises from tax on profits for up to 15years. This was 
however, not enough to guarantee the success of the 1960 code as foreign investors, 
though attracted by these incentives and benefits, emphasised a coherent and trust-worthy 
trade policy and framework which were visibly absent in the 1960 code. The code was 
entangled in too many administrative red tape and bottle-necks.
64
 An investment code 
hampered by such inadequacies was bound to fail, giving way to the 1984 investment 
code. 
 
2.6.2 The 1984 Investment Code 
 
This code was ratified by Law No 84-03 of 04 July 1984. 
The main thrust of this code was the recognition of the importance of private 
investment and the opening up of the economy, to the achievement of the objectives 
of the Sixth Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan. The 
incentives were centered on important tariff exonerations for some imports and more 
fiscal inducements. The aim now was to encourage not only private domestic 
investment, but also foreign investment in productive activities. Much emphasis was 
given to the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises.
65
 
According to Ndiva K, the main incentives and guarantees of the 1960 code were directed 
at foreign investors rather than domestic investors. The 1984 code had the same focus 
                                                          
62
 In order to attract foreign investors to invest in the country, various incentives were offered them, like exempting 
them from paying royalties in the mining and timber industry under schedule A and B enterprises from tax on all 
profits made for up to a period if 15 years  
63
 Nkwi P and Nyamnjoh F „Regional Balance and National Integration  in Cameroon, Lessons Learned‟ in 
Ngwasiri C The Effectiveness of Legal Instruments in Achieving Regional Balance and National Integration in 
Cameroon ed (2011) 59-68 
64
81 percent of the industries where clustered only in 2 of the 10 regions of the country (the Littoral and the Central 
South regions of the country). This gross regional imbalance proved a lack of commitment on the part of policy 
makers to foreign investors. 
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 Sunday A and Bamou T „An Analysis of FDI flows to Cameroon‟ 2006 African Economic Research Consortium  
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according to Sunday and Bamou
66
 who were also of the same opinion as Ndiva K. Thus 
the basis of the 1984 code which was intended to correct the short-comings of the 1960 
was found to be the same as that of the latter. One of the major incentives of the 1984 code 
was the country‟s adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the 
Bretton‟s Wood Institution. The procedure to establish an industry under the 1984 code 
was as long and bureaucratic as that of the 1960 code. Foreign investors, at whom the code 
was primarily directed, found the entire investment climate in the country ineffective. The 
lack of trust and loss of confidence by foreign investors led policy makers to adopt the 
1990 code. 
 
 
 
2.6.3 The 1990 Investment Code   
 
 Ordinance No. 90/007 of 08 November 1990 promulgated the 1990 Investment Code into 
law. 
This code replaced Law No 84/3 of July 4, 1984 (1984 Code) and is intended to plug 
some of the gaping holes in the 1984 Code and to play a catalytic role in the 
government‟s strategy to contain the economic crisis by attracting badly needed 
domestic and FDI to the country. The Code‟s overarching objective is the 
encouragement and promotion of productive investments in the country through 
liberalisation of the economy.
67
  
Incentives were available to open to both domestic and private investors in the application 
of the 1990 Code.  
 
2.7 The Importance of FDI on the Growth of the Economy 
 
The importance attached to foreign direct investment in the growth and development 
process has led a number of African countries to put in place various measures  
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 Apart from improving their investment environment - which they hope will attract 
foreign direct investment to their economies, many countries have put in place 
different incentives (sometimes called “sweeteners”) to ensure that resources are 
directed to areas and sectors where they are badly needed to deal with the issues of 
employment generation and poverty elimination.
68
 
 
A major benefit of FDI is it contribution to technological development, job creation, 
infrastructural development, and human capital development etc. These are critical elements for 
economic development in a country. Thus, countries with great FDI inflows benefit from the 
positive spillover effects of FDI, such as, technological advancement on the development of the 
economy. Technological advancement comes with economic growth due to the benefits these 
work opportunities bring to the host country. The host country, therefore, has the advantage of an 
increased employment rate and a greater cash flow into the economy, while, on the other hand, 
the investors experience an increase in growth rate from the investment and diversification of 
their business in another country (host country).
69
    
 
The importance of FDI on the growth of an economy varies from country to country. 
Traditionally, FDI was a phenomenon greatly associated with developed countries. Though 
developed countries attracted more FDI in the past than developing countries, the recent trend of 
FDI flows shows an increase in the FDI flow to developing countries, resulting to a paradigm 
shift. Average annual flows to developing countries soared eight fold, if compared with 1982- 
1987 and 1994-1999 records. Consequently, developing countries attracted almost one third of 
worldwide FDI flows recently. The explanation for this is simply that, unlike before, the 
importance of FDI is more pre-dominant in developing countries than in developed countries 
today.
70
 
The need for marketing and manufacturing Cameroon‟s raw material also led its policy makers 
to draft the 1960 code, but after realising that its objectives were not being met, they kept on 
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 Ajayi S „FDI and Economic Development in Africa‟ available at 
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modifying the investment codes, which has brought the country to the current 2002 Investment 
Charter. 
FDI inflows over the years have contributed to higher supply capacities for Cameroon‟s raw and 
primary products for industrialised finished goods, as the output has been able to meet the 
standard expectations, thereby satisfying the foreign markets. Secondly, Cameroon‟s export 
performance has been enhanced by local firms through the spill over effects, from for example, 
the transfer of expert technology, information and skills acquired from foreign investors through 
MNCs located in the country. Finally, a positive effect of FDI on the Cameroonian economy has 
been the effect of competition between MNEs and local firms, which has motivated local 
manufacturers to improve and increase their exports in order to protect their market shares and 
earnings. This implies FDI‟s significant contribution to higher exports, through improvements in 
the supply capacity and the facilitation of economic growth.
71
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the different definitions of FDI as put forward by different authors and 
a few international organisations. From there, the chapter moved on to define „foreign investor‟ 
from a Cameroon and universal perspectives. It examines the regulation of FDI as per the 
Investment Charter.   
The concept of FDI from universal, regional and national perspectives was also been explored. 
This was followed by an examination of the regulation of FDI in Cameroon. Prescriptions are to 
the effect that there should be less reliance on the benevolence of the executive; since if these 
rights can be implemented simply by writing a decree, it would also be possible to suspend them 
by the stroke of a pen. This explains the fact that investors do not have any certainty that the law 
is going to be enforced, given the fact that the law has been issued by a powerful executive. 
Credibility cannot be created by decree; investors need a credible commitment to be able to 
invest in another country. The primary cause of these institutional uncertainties in Cameroon is 
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the absence of checks and balances. Instead of the three equal powers
72
, Cameroon has a very 
powerful executive that changes laws and their enforcement at will. Nor can the legislature, 
which is practically an extension of the authoritative executive, present contrary claims against 
the executive or the electorate. In Cameroon, the executive does virtually what it likes, and the 
only reaction of investors is to get involved in the informal sector or preferably as has been the 
case over decades, to leave the country.
73
In the face of these dilemmas and others that would be 
identified in subsequent chapters, Cameroon would have to seek a solution from multi-lateral and 
regional organisations and not only adopt them but put them effectively into action. 
The chapter further more examines the provisions governing investment law in Cameroon from 
the first investment law when the country gained independence in 1960 up to the current 2002 
Investment Charter. The chapter ended with the importance of FDI in the economy of the 
country 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 The ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
IN THE PROMOTION OF FDI IN CAMEROON 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Government of Cameroon has signed several international, regional and bilateral treaties and 
is a member of several international organisations aimed at developing its economy.
74
 Cameroon 
is one of those developing countries that have benefited from the WTO rules in many respects. 
Cameroon became a member of the WTO in 1995, and since then, it has signed various bilateral, 
regional and multilateral trade agreements guided by WTO rules on trade. Cameroon is also a 
member of UNCTAD, an international organisation aimed at improving the ability of developing 
countries in attracting investors and investment capital.
75
 This chapter aims to show that 
international treaties and rules of international organisations have contributed to policy formation 
in Cameroon to enhance investor interest. 
As a member of the WTO, Cameroon has benefited from trade policies, such as, the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, which encompasses non-discrimination and national 
treatment principles. MFN principles have over the years been used by governments trying to 
protect their investors and investment in another country. These policies have acted as incentives 
and security for foreign investors moving into Cameroon. It is against this backdrop Cameroon  
and the United States of America signed a bilateral investment treaty to protect investors under 
the principle of non-discrimination.
76
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This chapter shows that despite the advantages of belonging to multilateral, regional and bilateral 
relationships with developed and developing countries, Cameroon is yet to see a significant 
growth in her investment inflows. 
Cameroon‟s membership with the WTO has granted it the privilege of receiving the most-
favoured nation treatment principle (MFN) from all its trading partners, and gives it the observer 
status in the committee on the Agreement on Government Procurement. Gaining recognition 
from the WTO as a developing nation, the country further benefited from a transitional period 
after its implementation of a number of provisions in various WTO agreements such as the 
customs valuation agreement and the agreement on import licensing procedures.
77
 Cameroon‟s 
membership in the WTO has given it an added preferential and unique treatment based on the 
advantage of its rich agricultural diversity.
78
 This has facilitated the economic development of 
the country. 
By acceding to the WTO on 13 December 1995, Cameroon has, as seen above been a beneficiary 
of this World Trade Organisation in various ways, and has been bound by numerous bi-lateral, 
regional and multi-lateral trading systems (MTS) in which the country has been enabled to 
participate effectively and to benefit from its rules, promoting the development of its trade, both 
internally and externally. Some of these bilateral investment treaties were signed with Germany-
1963, Switzerland-1964, the Netherlands-1966, Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union-1981, 
Romania-9181, the United Kingdom-1985, the United States of America-1989, Egypt-200, 
Mauritius-2001, Mauritania-2001, Mali-2001, and Italy-2004.
79
 
The Doha Development Round working under the WTO met at the fourth ministerial conference 
at Qatar in November 2001 and came up with a strategic plan under which recognition was given 
to the economic developmental needs of developing countries such as Cameroon.
80
 These 
included the imposition of standard manufacturing requirements on foreign investors, protection 
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of domestic producers, use of binding obligations on technology transfer, and avoiding the 
dominance of local firms. On the one hand, the host country governments, the majority of which 
are developing countries, have established well-structured principles to enable them to maximise 
FDI benefits in the technological development of their economies.
81
 On the other hand, foreign 
investors seek to obtain maximum benefit from their investments, if this is not achieved, they 
move out of the host country. 
In addition, Cameroon profited from the principle of non-reciprocity given to developing 
countries under the Lome Convention. This principle which provisionally ended after the signing 
of the Cotonou Agreement in the 2000 and was effected by  the signing of the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2008, enabled investors to export to European countries duty 
free. Despite criticism that it retarded trade in developing countries, it played a significant role in 
boosting trade and investment in Cameroon.  
One of the main reasons why private investors engage in international trade is to make profits. 
For example in Cameroon foreign investors during the 1960s, could not make profits; as a result 
investment projects were discontinued of investment projects, while others left the country. 
The role of the law is to preserve the interests of the source country and the host country. 
Paragraph 37 of the Doha Declaration, recognises the need for technology to be transferred to 
developing countries within the mandate of the WTO.
82
 Cameroon being a developing country is 
one of the recipient countries recognised by the WTO as a country in need of a transfer of 
technology from developed countries.  
The low levels of FDI flows to Africa is symbolic of the region‟s failure to integrate into the 
global economy and a principal reason why it‟s growth performance labours under a narrow 
export base and low productivity levels. High production costs and distorted investment 
incentives, which discourage the entry of foreign firms (even where profitable opportunities are 
available) and a bias against those that come with less productive activities, have been attributed 
to a history of misguided policies and listless reforms. Consequently, African policy makers over 
the years have been encouraged to maximize efforts to establish a competitive investment 
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climate by integrating more closely into the global economy, and to become more transparent 
and inclusive in their own reform efforts. These reforms promise to attract foreign firms to 
countries whose investment policies are marketable as a result of the fact that competition is at 
its height amongst developing countries seeking the presence of foreign firms.
83
 Some countries 
in the region have had resounding success, while others have not, due to the availability of 
natural resources and the intensity of the competition in the face of globalization. 
The main developmental challenge facing African leaders today is how to attract FDI to the 
region. In this regard, numerous efforts have been made in the past to accelerate FDI inflows in 
the region but without yielding much fruit. Some of these failures can be attributed to ill-
conceived strategies, which did not lift underlying constraints on FDI into the region. Failure to 
confront the economic challenges in the region posed by the globalization process, has also 
affected the continent. The fact that foreign investors regard Africa as a high risk investment 
region is a major challenge as this brings doubts and uncertainty, and is one of the major 
explanations of the region‟s poor FDI record. Political instability, the high incidence of wars, 
frequent military interventions in politics, and poor infrastructural development, to name a few, 
has all contributed to the low FDI inflows.
84
 
Regional integration is a worldwide phenomenon experienced in almost every part of the world. 
In the period 1948 to 1994, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT had) received 
almost 124 notifications of regional trade agreements, and 90 more notifications have been 
received by the GATT since 1995. Of these 134 are presently active. Today, almost every 
member of the WTO is a member of one of these regional trade agreements. Cameroon, like 
other African states is a member of numerous regional as well as international organisation: it is 
a member of the African Union (AU), Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), CEMAC, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). It also signed the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York 
Convention. It is equally a party to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement of 23 June 2000, which 
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provides for an arbitration mechanism to settle disputes between ACP states and entrepreneurs, 
suppliers or providers of services in connection with European Development Fund Financing.
85
 
Regional integration answers the question why and how states cease to be wholly sovereign, and 
how and why they willingly come together, most often from the same region, and lose their 
sovereignty for a common goal, to ensure regional security, mitigate the circumstances that cause 
conflict, and expand the market of each member state, with the ultimate purpose of integrating in 
the global market so as to accelerate growth on the economy.
86
 
 
3.2 Impact of the CEMAC Investment Code on Cameroon 
  
CEMAC has a long history dating as far back as 1964. Then called the Central African Customs 
and Economic Union (UDEAC), a group of Central African countries committed themselves 
after independence to bring about regional integration for political and economic objectives. The 
underlying purpose was that each member state achieves economic strength and together 
acquires the benefits that ensue from countries teaming up together. Created in Brazzaville 
(Congo), it was aimed at promoting intra-regional trade among Central African countries. 
UDEAC was revived in 1994 to give rise to CEMAC.
87
 
CEMAC, a sub-regional organisation, is comprised of six member states: Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. The main purpose of 
this organisation is the promotion of trade and a common market among its members through 
economic integration among countries sharing the same currency the CFA. The advantage that 
comes along with this integration is the solidarity among members who all have the advantage of 
receiving quota restrictions and tariff reduction. The ultimate aim was however to create a 
common central African market.  Thus a sub-regional market functions within the frame work of 
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economic and monetary union by merging into a common political, financial, legal and 
economic structures and policies.
88
 
Cameroon is the largest member of the CEMAC region in terms of population. Among the six 
member states it makes up 50% of the population and benefits most from this organisation as it 
poses the regional market power with an enormous amount of gain on its economy. Cameroon 
though small on the world market constitutes about 50% of the CEMAC market, thus making it a 
regional market giant under the CEMAC umbrella.
89
 It is proven that CEMAC grew with more 
than 97% in the period 2000 to 2006
90
 CEMAC‟s Investment Charter was adopted in 1999. 
 Cameroon‟s adherence to CEMAC is embedded in various sections of its current investment 
charter. For example section 16 of Cameroon‟s Investment Charter, reasserts the state‟s option of 
regional integration in particular within the framework of the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the Economic Community for Central African States 
CEEAC). 
Cameroon‟s commitment to the CEMAC investment code is defined in Section 33 of the 
Cameroon‟s investment charter, stating in (1) the state‟s guarantee on the application of 
moderate customs duties and adherence to the principles of their reduction within the framework 
of the policy defined by CEMAC and in conformity with the provisions of the World Trade 
Organisation. 
(2) The State reaffirming its willingness to implement the economic and deferred payment 
regimes provided for in the CEMAC customs code.
91
 
According to article 1 of the CEMAC investment code, Cameroon benefits from this Treaty as a 
result of it strengthening competition of its economic and financial activity, Cameroon also 
benefits from the common market through its membership to this organisation: the free mobility 
of goods, capital, persons and services within this common economy is guaranteed. The 
governing body, according to the CEMAC investment code, met and agreed on the creation of 
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the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) for the purpose of strengthening monetary policy 
within the common market. This is an added advantage for the Cameroonian economy as the 
circulation of cash flow and the credibility of its currency are stabilised. This creates an 
assurance for foreign investors to invest in Cameroon as it both creates access to market in 
Cameroon and there is a possibility of market choice within the CEMAC region in terms of the 
harmonised currency, the Franc CFA in (Communaute Financiere Africaine).
92
 This encourages 
foreign investors to invest in Cameroon knowing that, with the   CFA in Cameroon alone
93
, it 
would be exchanged with and circulated around member countries in the region. Important to 
note is the fact that the BEAC that governs the monetary affairs of the CEMAC region are 
situated in Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon. 
The target of a majority of the foreign investors in Cameroon is the sub-region and not 
Cameroon alone. This can be explained by the fact that foreign investors are attracted into 
Cameroon due to it‟s affiliation to the CEMAC region. The current Cameroon Investment 
Charter conforms to the Investment Charter of the CEMAC region.
94
The CEMAC investment 
code has, therefore, played a major role in directing the interest of private investors in investing 
in Cameroon. Consequently, efforts targeted at FDI are stronger due to the CEMAC investment 
code. Cameroon is keen to uphold the image of the country, regarding the location of the BEAC 
in Cameroon as a privilege. 
Since the CEMAC region shares a common monetary and exchange rate framework, Cameroon, 
like other CEMAC members, does not face any monetary issues individual; on the contrary, any 
issues of this nature are addressed to the entire region.
95
This is of great advantage to Cameroon 
as the country it is saved from inflation or deflation, which is an eminent concern as the CEMAC 
economy is heavily dependent on oil exports causing the region‟s economic stability to rise or 
fall with the price of oil. This regional balance has a positive effect on Cameroon‟s FDI statistics. 
 Cameroon‟s membership of the CEMAC region is increasingly becoming a tool in the 
promotion of its FDI strategies and a means for the legitimisation of its policies. Peace and 
harmony are maintained within the region. This is an indication of the fact that effective 
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implementation of the region‟s strategies and priorities, combined with Cameroon‟s domestic 
policy reforms, would attract increased regional and FDI given the country‟s rich endowment 
with natural resources and primary products.
96
 
 
3.3 THE OHADA Frame-work Policy on Investment Regulation 
 
There had to be a harmonisation of African investment laws due to the lack of harmonisation not 
only at the sub-regional level, but also at regional levels, which consequently hindered the 
prospects of meaningful sub-regional economic co-operation and development. This is carried 
out by doing away with the disadvantageous effects of the individual national differences.
97
 
OHADA, like CEMAC, is an idea from Africa,s policy makers to create a secure legal 
framework for all businesses in a bid to promote economic integration. It is an international 
organisation created by the signature of a treaty signed in Port-Louis (Mauritius) on 17 October 
1993 by 14 African states. OHADA is known in French as „Organization pour l‟Harmonisation 
du Droit des Affaires en Afrique‟.98The idea behind the creation of OHADA was that each of the 
member states agreed to give up their national sovereignty in favour of a single but stronger 
cross-border regime of uniform business laws for the development of West Africa. This was 
going to be targeted through the promotion of investment in general and FDI in particular.
99
 
Its principal aim, however, is the establishment of a modern and accessible system of unified 
business law in Africa, uniformly applicable in all the member states. Though influenced greatly 
by French civil law, the purpose of OHADA is to create a real African system without having 
French law infiltrating the organisation.
100
 
Many scholars are of the opinion that the principal objectives of OHADA are to harmonise 
business laws throughout member states and provide a secure judicial environment for foreign 
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investment.
101
 Other writers find no problem with the harmonisation process as they consider  
OHADA laws the second national laws which apply to the operation of foreign business interest. 
Article 13 of OHADA is cited as being applicable to foreign investments as to its content and 
application within the nation concerned. Cameroon is amongst the countries that have ratified the 
OHADA treaty rendering its application acceptable to business operating within the national 
territory. In Cameroon, Article 97 of the 1984 investment code deals directly with the 
registration of private businesses hosted in the country under the authority of the Registrar of 
Commerce at the Ministry of Commerce in the nation‟s capital, Yaoundé. Directly of interest to 
Cameroon is equally Article 103 which deals with the domiciliation of private companies‟ 
representatives within the territory of one of the member governments of OHADA.
102
 Other 
writers see it as common law unfriendly
103
 
Others see Article 42 of the OHADA treaty as discriminatory against English speaking 
nations.
104
 
The OHADA frame-work policy, even though much has been said about it, has not been 
favourable to English speaking community. What is of interest now is: whether the laws are 
supple and favourable for investment which will go a long way to assist development in member 
countries. 
It is not surprising that out of the 53 members of the African Union (AU), only two have joined 
the original 14members of OHADA since its creation in 1993. Mauritius is not a member even 
though it hosted the meeting that led to the OHADA treaty. Ghana, which who hosted the Ghana 
National Committee, is still contemplating the possibility of joining the OHADA. Cameroon 
became a member of OHADA in 1994. 
The bulk of African investment law is still young. It is therefore rather difficult to 
assess the adequacy of their provisions in the light of declared objectives. It is 
however, demonstrable that the existing legal provisions for the grant of economic 
benefits are too diverse to allow for generalisation, and the investor who would prefer 
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to invest under uniform conditions in a group of African countries instead of in one 
small one is faced with a confused state of affairs. On a number of major issues, 
however, the investment laws of Africa are almost parallel. All this indicates that 
serious thought must now be given to the evaluation, clarification and harmonisation 
of African investment laws.
105
 
 
3.4 Dispute Settlement 
Section 11 of Law No 2002/004 of 19 April 2002 instituting the Cameroon Investment 
Charter makes provision for the settlement of investment disputes. It states that: 
 (1) The State shall be party to bilateral and multilateral agreements which guarantee 
investments. It is thus signatory to:  
 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Awards, concluded under the auspices of the United Nations ; 
 The Washington Convention to set up the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
(2) The State is signatory to: 
 The Seoul Convention of 11 October 1985 to set up the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) aimed at safeguarding non-commercial risks ; 
 The OHADA treaty in pursuance of which modern and simple legal provisions based on 
international practice, have been drafted to constitute business law. 
 
(3) As member of the OHADA zone, the State has both an ad hoc and an institutional 
arbitration mechanism based on the most effective international instruments, such as the 
standard law of the United Nations Commission for International Business Law 
(UNCITRAL) on international arbitration of 1985 and the Arbitration Settlement of the 
International Chamber of Commerce of 1998. 
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(4) The State is signatory to the Lome Convention as revised in Mauritius on 4 November 
1995, which set up an arbitration mechanism for settling disputes between Africa-Caribbean 
and Pacific States (ACP) and contractors, suppliers and service providers, relating to 
financing by the European Development Fund (EDF). 
 
 Cameroon is considered a safe haven in SSA, regulates alternative dispute resolution and hosts 
eight neutrals, (four arbitrators and four conciliators) on the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Panel of Arbitrators and Conciliators.
106
 National laws have 
designated the competent courts mentioned in the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration, having 
established the conditions for referring matters to them.
107
 
The Cameroon investment code makes provision for trade and investment dispute settlement. 
At the time of incorporation or application for investment code benefits, a firm may opt for one 
of the various procedures to settle future conflicts. A limited number of investment disputes 
have come to the attention of the U.S. embassy. These often involve taxation questions, and in 
one instance, local business partners stole an American investor's equipment.
108
 This is not, 
however, evident in Cameroon, as the Cameroon judicial system is incompetent to handle the 
procedures leading to the settlement of investment disputes. 
Individuals and private companies are to have locus standi before the court. The 
proposed court should be empowered to issue, in appropriate cases, provisional 
measures taken by the other party during the currency of the proceedings. The 
proposed tribunal shall apply the general principles of international law to questions 
of international law. In case of disputes connected with investment contracts, the 
tribunal is to base its decision on the law of the contract and pacta sunt servvanda. 
The awards of the court shall be recognised and enforceable in all contracting states 
by the application of the principles of the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
109
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The difficulties inherent in the settlement of disputes by the Cameroonian judicial system
110
 have 
been salvaged by an agreement between the United Nations (UN) and the Cameroonian 
government through the U N development programme for the promotion of governance reform 
that includes proposed measures to improve the performance of Cameroon‟s courts. Government 
authorisation and approval of this program was received in June 2000.
111
 
In spite of this intervention by the UN, private investors still exhibit a lack of confidence 
towards the Cameroonian judicial system, which has a negative impact on the flow of FDI into 
the country.  
The case of the theft of an American investor‟s equipment by local business partners is a case 
of an investor who has been deprived of investment property abroad by a foreign partner. This 
case gave also proved the worth of the New York Convention‟s on the recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in settling dispute. In this circumstance the American investor 
would ordinarily seek justice from the Cameroonian courts of First Instance, charged with 
handling investment disputes, which would be expected to base its decision on the law of the 
contract. It is only then that the awards of the courts shall be recognised and enforceable in 
accordance with the principles of the New York Convention on the recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.    
 
3.5 A Comparative Study on FDI Policies in Cameroon and Gabon 
 
In an attempt to attract FDI which has put it far ahead when compared to Cameroon, and other 
developing countries, Gabon has targeted various investment incentives with positive results. 
Competition among developing countries has led to a proliferation of various incentives 
presented to foreign investors in West and Central Africa, but those provided by Gabon have 
appealed to MNCs and has led to their investing in Gabon more than in Cameroon and most 
other African states. The preceding chapter indicated how the attractiveness of Gabon‟s 
investment policies has influenced and determined MNC‟s preference to invest in that 
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country.
112
What made Gabon attract FDI were not its less restrictive policies alone; if that has 
been the case, Cameroon would have been as successful as Gabon in attracting FDI. 
Accompanying its less restrictive policies, Gabon created sound business reasons for such 
foreign investment, and investors in recent times have responded positively to them. New criteria 
for assessing the soundness of proposed ventures in developed countries may not have had 
anything to do with investment legislation.
113
 It is only when such business reasoning coincides 
with the vision of investors that the decision to invest in the host country follows. 
Gabon gained independence in 1960. In Gabon FDI inflows are largely derived from oil and 
mineral resources. Gabon has international trade relations with several countries in Africa, 
Europe and the Middle East. Policies favourable to FDI in Gabon include the practice which 
unofficially allows prices to be set by the oil industry, rendering labour costs expensive. The 
business reason behind this being that though the practice is unofficial, but the fact of it being 
consistent renders it advantageous in the business circle. This obviously has an advantage over 
Cameroon‟s investment climate flawed by inconsistency. What has equally boosted Gabon‟s FDI 
policies is the retention of the hundreds of French service companies that have been in Gabon 
since before independence, and which are still actively functional to date. Some of them are: 
banking, insurance, transportation and health care. These serve as a channel for building up new 
industries. Gabon‟s policy-makers effectively step up efforts to improve the business climate and 
increase its attractiveness by creating updated market vision and strategy.
114
 This is evidently 
absent in Cameroon‟s FDI policies which are less dynamic. 
Gabon‟s investment code was promulgated in 1989, and contains incentives similar to those 
other francophone countries. Gabon has a liberal FDI policy, in the sense that there are no 
restrictions on the introduction of foreign capital into Gabon. This is a liberal policy as well as an 
incentive that has for long attracted many French investors. Gabon remains the only French 
speaking African country with such a liberal economic policy. With neither bureaucracy nor 
restriction, Gabon‟s investment policies are favourable to FDI and the introduction of foreign 
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capital into the country without restriction.
115
 Policies that favour FDI in Gabon such as the new 
investment code liberalise and streamline investment procedures and provide for equal treatment. 
Large foreign firms established in Gabon operate on an equal basis with local firms. No cases of 
discrimination against or expropriation of foreign firms have been heard in court.
116
In Gabon a 
commission has been set up to cater exclusively for issues related to investments. In addition to 
all of this Gabon has a strong economy
117
 
Gabon‟s policy-makers have carefully planned strategies to encourage foreign investment so as 
to achieve the country‟s industrial development strategies targets. Privatisation amongst others, 
is one way of achieving these goals. In this respect, a number of firms have been privatised, 
including some in the following areas: which include; water and electricity (1997), sugar (1997), 
timber (1998), importation and distribution of sundry products (1998), cement (2000), and 
railways (2004).Gabon‟s position as the SSA‟s third largest oil exporter gives the country a 
positive image in respect of its FDI policies.
118
 
 
3.6 REGIONALISM AND INVESTMENT 
 
“Regionalism is the process of building multilateral institutions to enhance political, security, 
and economic interaction among states.”119 In this process governments usually cede some of 
their sovereignty to a regional institution so as to reap the benefits of integration. Regionalism 
ensures political and economic reforms that are binding to member states. Such reforms are more 
sustainable and enforceable that national reforms.
120
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Regionalism is strategic in investment because, trade and investment relationships are strongest 
amongst countries in the same regional organisation.
121
In this part of the work, investigations are 
going to be carried out on whether regionalism increases or lowers investment. Unlike Wilfred J 
who asserts that regionalism involves a big country linking up with one or more small ones 
making significant reforms, This view is contrary to that of the writer of this paper in that from 
an African perspective, regionalisms should be considered as meaning, small countries linking 
up together to acquire those advantages available to bigger countries. 
It is submitted that developing countries through regionalism see the ability to attract FDI as a 
step into private investment. To attract FDI Africa, competition amongst different regional 
groups in Africa should be encouraged. Natural endowments of one country over another would 
give the regional organisation to which that country belongs an added advantage in attracting 
FDI over other regional organisations in the continent.
122
  
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
   
It is thanks to international and regional organisations that the few MNCs left in Cameroon are 
still in operation. Cameroon‟s strategic position in the CEMAC region has given it added 
advantages, which result in it being known as the bread-winner of the region, and  have opened 
doors for private investors in the country. Added to these advantages is Cameroon‟s bilingual 
nature which gives it additional advantages in terms of attracting FDI.
123
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Appraisal of MNCs in Cameroon and Prospects for Positive FI inflows 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to expound on the discussion in the previous chapter and explore on 
mechanisms that might oblige Cameroon policy makers enable foreign investors operate their 
business in a way that would be beneficial to both ends, that is to the foreign investors on one 
hand and the Cameroon public on the other hand (the host country and home country). 
Incidentally, in Cameroon, MNCs were considered the only channel for economic development 
before the wave of privatisation swept through Africa in the 1980s and 90s.
124
 
Cameroon is an underdeveloped country with very poor infrastructure as would be seen in the 
latter part of this chapter. This gives it limited knowledge on how to deal with MNCs, especially 
considering the fact that the first investment regulation was implemented in the 1960s when the 
country had no expertise in dealing with MNCs. The second and third investment regulations of 
1984, 1990, including the current 2002 Investment Charter were based on this first investment 
code of 1960 implemented at a time when the country had very little knowledge of evaluating 
foreign investment and technology. Due to this lack of expertise in evaluating foreign investment 
and technology, it was difficult to evaluate the proportion of technological transformation from 
the natural products available in the country.
125
 
Cameroon is limited in its determination to bring about a positive FDI inflow in the country 
through MNCs operating there, because of its weak regulatory frame-work. In the subsequent 
study of this chapter, it would be seen that poor infrastructure is one of the main problems facing 
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investors in the country. The veracity of this statement is however debatable with regard to the 
regulatory frame work of the country vis a vis these usually huge entities operating in a small 
and developing country as Cameroon.
126
  
 There is evidence however from the previous chapter that FDI through the establishment of 
MNCs are not a means to an end in the development of the Cameroon economy. Factors like 
privatisation and economic integration have been shown to have a positive influence on the 
economy of Cameroon. For example, taking advantage of its strategic position in the CEMAC 
region, Cameroon has seen its economy flourish, especially considering its numerous natural 
endowments and the advantage it has over population in the CEMAC region.
127
  
This chapter contains the main theme of the study, which includes the strength of FDI in 
Cameroon. The chapter continues by focusing on the critique of the factors that affects FDI in 
Cameroon such as weak institutions, corruption, poor infrastructure economic and tax policies 
and poor governance policies. This analysis will be further carried out on the platform of a case-
study of DHL and MTN, by highlighting difficulties on which MNCs operate in Cameroon and 
providing suggested solutions to these. To achieve the objective of the chapter, a comparism of 
DHL and MTN will be necessary. The former succeeding in Cameroon due to the fact that 
location is irrelevant for the services provided by this company, while the latter does not succeed 
because there must be a commercial presence for it to operate successfully.  
MNCs also known as Multinational enterprise can therefore be defined as a firm that owns or 
controls income generating assets in more than one country. Thus a MNC establishes 
international trade transactions through engagement in FDI. These are business enterprises with 
ownership, management, production and sales activities located in two or more countries.
128
 An 
example is the case of DHL operating in Cameroon with headquarters in Germany, and the MTN 
operating in Cameroon with headquarters in South Africa.  
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4.2 Problems faced by Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) Operating in 
Cameroon and Proposed Solutions 
 
Cameroon underperforms in terms of attracting FDI due to the numerous limitations facing 
MNCs operating in the country, which puts off prospective private investors from the country to 
neighboring countries like Gabon who have more favorable working conditions, and limits the 
full potentials of those already operating there. The challenge facing Cameroon is therefore how 
to transform it into a more desirable destination for FDI and make conditions for those MNCs 
already operating there workable and more appealing.  
MNCs often find themselves operating in countries with difficult production capacity, where 
conditions liable to ease production are inadequate, scarce or lacking. In the case of Cameroon, 
this is usually made more difficult with other social upheavals like the problem of bilingualism, 
political instability, currency, ethnic disputes,
129
 (arising from the 250 ethnic languages 
present)
130
 and epidemic diseases inherent in the country. This doubles the task of managers as 
they find themselves mediating for peace and promoting the interests of their companies 
alongside. As previously mentioned, this makes business more cumbersome as the business 
expert would on several occasions find himself playing the double role of a peace mediator and 
business professional at the same time. This increases the task of the investor and makes it more 
difficult also in terms of finance. Working in a country with social unrest will inevitably lead to a 
failed company. 
131
  
For Cameroon to derive the estimated benefit from the presence of MNCs in its territory, the 
government must make sure certain conditions are put in place for a smooth take off of the 
production and investment process.
132
 This would ultimately attract FDI in the country rather 
discourage them because funds that would have been used for infrastructure like the transport 
network, water or electricity, being the responsibility of the government, would rightly be 
invested into the business. 
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The international presence of MNCs in Cameroon through its engagement in FDI can positively 
be reflected in its economy only if some of the problems inherent in the country listed below are 
dealt with by the government. 
 
4.2.1 Infrastructure 
 
The infrastructure development of a region is also important, since it indicates how 
difficult and costly it may be to do business in the country. The more developed the 
road system in a country, for example, the easier the access to markets and the lower 
the transportation costs, and, thus, the greater the incentive to invest in that country. 
The multi-dimensional nature of infrastructure makes it difficult to measure, however 
it comprises roads, telecommunications, and railways and so on. It is difficult to 
capture the many aspects of infrastructure development, and the data available are 
limited.
133
  
 
Developing the transport sector is one of the most acute problems facing policy makers in 
Cameroon.
134
 In Cameroon, the roads and railway transport linking production centers and 
market are in deplorable conditions. Conditions as poor as this in basic infrastructure 
facilities hinders industrial development in general and steady flow of FDI in particular.
135
 
 
Nearly 80% of paved roads, 73% of gravel roads and 70% of rural tracks are in 
mediocre or bad condition. Traffic counts for the year 2001 show that paved and 
gravel roads together carried about 90% of traffic. More than 75% of the road network 
is in poor condition. Funding is required to prevent further degradation and loss of 
priority networks.
136
   
 
The popular saying that roads lead to development justifies one of Cameroon‟s inability to attract 
investment due to its deplorable road network as seen from the statistic above. This means that 
without proper infrastructure the economy would be stagnant and FDI flow retarded. Apart from 
the inconveniences it may cause to foreign investors, it acts as a major barrier to investment due 
to the fact that there is a tremendous increase in cost due to the country‟s poor road network. It is 
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acclaimed that, the more developed the road system is, the easier the markets and the lower the 
transportation cost, thus the more attractive the country would be to investors.
137
This is not the 
case in Cameroon as the road network is relatively poor and so investors for fear of an increase 
in cost of production are reluctant to invest in the country. It is objective to come to an 
indisputable conclusion that private investors most often would prefer to invest in countries with 
higher degrees of infrastructural development. Consequently, in order to attract FDI, the country 
needs to provide infrastructure of an improved quality than the existing infrastructure.138 
 Hence for Cameroon to be able to attract foreign investors, its policy makers should 
prioritise infrastructure projects.
139
 If this is not done, Cameroon would continue to 
underperform in attracting FDI as poor roads would automatically lead to 
underperformance, due to the fact that Capital would be diverted to the reconstruction and 
repair of road rather than in investing and expanding on the business if the private 
investors decide to come and invest in the country. The foreign investor would in this case 
be condemned to exhaustion as a result of these or exposed to work under risky and 
difficult conditions which hampers the investment climate. The importance of 
infrastructure in stimulating FDI have been attested to by writers  like Wheeler and Moody 
(1992), Loree and Guisinger (1995), Richaud et al. (1999), Asiedu (2002), Morrisset 
(2000), Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis (2004) and Quazi (2005). The argument put 
forward by these writers is that proper infrastructure is a pre-requisite for private investors 
to operate smoothly.
140
  
As long as the road network in Cameroon remains in the state in which it is, there are little or no 
prospects of an increase in FDI, if attention is not given to the road construction maintenance and 
repairs. Foreign investors would not invest in Cameroon, as doing so would mean delayed, 
disrupted services which would end in unreliable and unsatisfactory services. Foreign investors 
in the region have often opted to invest in countries like Gabon which has more favorable 
conditions for investment. 
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4.2.2 Currency 
 
Foreign investors in Cameroon have problems converting the CFA into their home currencies, 
since the CFA is used only in a few French speaking countries. Another aspect linked to this 
currency issue which deters foreign investors, is the recurrent devaluation of the CFA francs. 
This causes a problem because convertibility is not guaranteed.  
Cameroon is a member of the French franc zone. Its currency, the franc de la 
Communauté Financière en Afrique Centrale (the CFA franc), is issued by the 
Banques des Etats de l‟Afrique Centrale (BEAC), and is pegged to the French franc. 
The exchange rate of the CFA franc in terms of the French franc, which had been 
fixed since 1948, was devalued by 50percent in foreign currency terms in January 
1994, thus changing the parity from CFAF 1 = 0.02 to CFAF = F 0.01.
141
 
The fact that there is no guarantee of the CFA already keeps foreign investors from investing in 
Cameroon as was the case of a 50percent devaluation in 1994 and rumors of another devaluation 
in 2012. 
142
 „The instability of the CFA francs was also presented as one of the contributing 
factors to private disinvestment in the country. But financial factors are not sufficient to explain 
this disinvestment. There were also causes of a political nature which help to understand the 
otherwise seemingly incomprehensible behaviors.‟143 These political reasons for disinvestment 
would be discussed below. 
The benefits of having a stable common currency rather than having 14 separate national 
currencies
144
 desired to strengthen monetary cooperation and deepen regional economic 
integration did not succeed in terms of prompting FDI in the franc zone to which Cameroon is a 
member.
145
 
In addition to the problems associated with currency is the problem of exchange rate. An investor 
would not be easily attracted to invest in Cameroon when the local currency (the CFA) does not 
have a stable exchange value. The fact that the currency is weak, and having an exchange rate 
                                                          
141
Dhaneshwar G Private Investment and Endogenous Growth: Evidence from Cameroon (1997) Washington DC 
(IMF African department) 
142
Tybout,Gauthier and Navaretti  „Firm-Level Responses to the CFA Devaluation in Cameroon‟ (1997)  6 Journal 
of African Economies  3-34 
143
 Atangana M „French Investment in Colonial Cameroon:The FIDES Era (1946-57)  (2009) New York 
144
 African member countries pegged to the CFA Franc Zone attached to France 
145
 Clément, Mueller and Cossé et al Aftermath of the CFA Devaluation (1996) Washington DC 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
that is liable to fluctuate constantly, puts off investors away from the country as they are stripped 
of any feeling of confidence and security investing in the country.
146
 
 
4.2.3 Language    
 
 Another factor that could discourage investors from investing in Cameroon is the deep rooted 
antagonism between the French majority and the Anglophone minority. The origin of this 
division was the handing over of the Republic of Kamerun the then part of the German 
protectorate since 14 July 1884 to Britain and France after World War 1 under the Versailles 
treaty. The reason why the French population makes up 8 of the 10 regions while the English 
population makes up only the remaining two is because during this partition between France and 
Britain, the greater share of the country went to France while Britain took the minor share.
147
 
This great disparity has led to a long struggle which is still ongoing till date, as the government 
has not been able to find ways to harmonise these differences which has spilled over to the legal 
sector and other factions of the government, with the English speaking community feeling 
suppressed and cheated by the French population. 
 The fact that these two groups have unequal status in the country, with the French population 
occupying 8 of the 10 regions of the country, while the English minorities occupy the two 
remaining regions in the country confirms the seclusion of the English speaking population from 
the country‟s economy. Often considered less patriotic, Anglophones have never been trusted to 
hold key cabinet portfolios, such as Territorial Administration, Economy and Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, National Security, and National Defense, since reunification more than 50years ago. In 
addition, the most powerful state-owned corporations, such as the CRTV, SNI, SNH, and SNEC 
have remained completely out of bounds for English speaking Cameroonians. Hence there is a 
feeling of frustration among Anglophones regarding their second class status.
148
 
                                                          
146
 Mwenda K Contemporary Issues in Corporate Finance and Investment Law (2000) Pennsylvania 
147
Fombad C „ The Scope for Uniform National Laws in Cameroon‟ (1991) 29 The Journal of Modern African 
Studies  443 56  
148
 Mbanaso U and Chima J Minorities and the State in Africa (2010) New York  
 
 
 
 
48 
 
This deep rooted division between the French and English speaking population originating as far 
back as when the country was partitioned between France and Britain after Germany was chased 
out of the country following its defeat after the Second World War, have discouraged 
prospective investors from the country, if they take into account issues such as the need for team 
spirit and collective efforts within the work force.
149
  
Surprisingly, there equally exists a marked uneasy cohabitation amongst the minority English 
population from the North West and South West region of the country. These socio-cultural 
antagonisms depict a structural approach to corporate management that may be totally different 
from the corporate culture of the MNC. 
Within that broad pragmatic way of doing things, there will be sub-cultures of various 
sub-units in the organisations. All these cultures have different characteristics. There 
could be some common elements between these cultures and there could be some 
entirely different elements. It is these different elements in different cultures                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
that provide a source of conflict. In particular the corporate culture of MNC may not 
be in conformity with the culture of the local people from whom the majority of the 
work force is drawn. When this happens, cultural conflict could prove to be a 
deterrent factor in attracting foreign investment to a country such as Cameroon.
150
 
In the face of language differences, the first president Ahmadou Ahidjo has since independence 
in 1960 appointed prime ministers from the North West region of the country which is one of the 
two speaking provinces of Cameroon, out of the ten.  
 
4.2.4 Political Instability 
 
For the purpose of this work, political instability would be, defined as the instability of 
governments, regimes, and communities within a nation, likely to affect economic growth 
adversely.
151
 This definition is reflective of the situation in Cameroon, where the political 
atmosphere is tense due to the marginalisation of the Anglophone Community who make up only 
two of the ten regions in the country, by the francophone majority who make up the eight 
remaining regions of the country. This huge disparity in terms of the English and French 
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population in the country creates an atmosphere of political instability as the Anglophones 
always feel dominated and cheated by the Francophones. Political instability has therefore been 
identified as one of the problems hindering private investors from investing in Cameroon. The 
early 1990s saw Cameroon experiencing a remarkable form of political instability in the history 
of the country, which lead to the death of six youths and many injured with the intervention of 
the police. This has led to groups like Amnesty International questioning Cameroon‟s record on 
political detention and torture.
152
 It would be important to note here that this negative reputation 
by the country obviously has an equal negative impact on its FdI policies as viewed by private 
investors and potential private investors. This position has been acclaimed by the writers below 
asserting that 
The importance of political stability in creating a climate of confidence for investors 
must not be underestimated. Whether perceived or real, political instability constitutes 
a serious deterrent to FDI as it creates uncertainties and increases risks and hence 
costs of doing business in the country. We use a combination of the two indexes of 
political freedom (political rights and civil liberties) as compiled by Freedom House 
to assess the effect of political risk on FDI. Freedom House combines these two 
indexes to classify countries into three categories: free, partially free and not free. 
Higher values for this index imply less political freedom. We add the two indexes to 
obtain a composite index of political risk in Cameroon. We expect that a higher 
political risk will deter foreign investors.
153
 
 
The conclusion of the above statement points to the fact that the political atmosphere in 
Cameroon has not reached a high index, but is at a level where political instability is eminent and 
sufficient to influence investment decisions. To understand the fact of this statement, a definition 
of political instability would be necessary. 
Political instability is characterised by uncertainty and this has the effect of restricting 
the development potential of developing countries, as investment opportunities and 
thus economic growth become distorted, both contemporaneous and over longer 
horizon. A politically unstable country will potentially destroy its intellectual capital 
by making it more rewarding to engage in corruption and other activities that generate 
distortions. Seen through this lens, political instability distorts incentives for 
development, but it‟s also possible that some dosage of political instability might be 
necessary to move a country to a good equilibrium by removing a corrupt regime from 
political office so as to restore confidence in governance. We call this “productive 
instability”, purging of distortions and inefficiencies in governance through the forces 
of political instability, whether by constitutional means or otherwise. Political 
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instability not only affects the home country, but can also adversely affect neighboring 
countries.
154
 
 
Having been in power for thirty years running, a good dosage of political instability would have 
been welcomed to remove the Biya regime so as to restore confidence in the Cameroon 
government since private investors are reluctant to invest capital in a country where its nationals 
are disgruntled and the probability of an outbreak of war eminent.   
 Cameroon unlike other SSA has not experienced much of political instability,
155
 but in instances 
where this has been registered, the outcome has not reflected positively on investment decisions 
in the country. 
A Politically stable country would attract foreign investors because its policies are certain and so 
are its economic policies which would reflect positively on its investment decisions and 
outcome. A country characterised by political instability on the other hand would have a stagnant 
or slow growth rate because of its uncertain policies. Probability of a change of government as 
was the case in Cameroon during the 2011 presidential election implies uncertain future policies 
as potential foreign investors would have to tarry to take strategic economic decisions or even 
welcome investment policies and decisions other nations with favorable investment opportunities 
have to offer. The probability of war alone in a country plays negatively on a country‟s 
investment record as this could scare potential investors away while those present would cease 
investing and instead look for ways to withdraw and reinvest abroad. 
 
 
4.3 A framework within which MNCs like the DHL and MTN operate in 
Cameroon 
 
This chapter will continue to examine the difficulties encountered by foreign investors operating 
in Cameroon. This will be done by looking at two specific MNCs currently operating in 
Cameroon; the DHL and the MTN. A brief resume of the conditions under which these MNCs 
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operate in the country will be uncovered. Both are surviving, but one is registering a lot of 
success than the other. The reason for these differences in results by two MNCS operating in the 
same country and under the same condition will be examined below. 
DHL is a courier service company and stands for the abbreviation of the surname of its three 
founders. D for Adrian Dalsey, H for Larry Hillblom and L for Robert Lynn.
156
 DHL is a well-
known company that offers courier services in about 227 countries today. DHL operates 
successfully in Cameroon because the company performs quality services everywhere no matter 
how deplorable infrastructure like the transport system, electricity services communication and 
portable water may be in the country. Consumers of DHL services know for certain that location 
is irrelevant.  
DHL is a global business: the company creates value for the customer by making 
location irrelevant. The customer is willing to pay the company in order to 
consistently obtain its service anywhere, anytime. The value the customer pays for 
arises from the irrelevance of location: the fact that he or she can get service from 
Bangkok to Paris as easily as from San Francisco to Buenos Aires is what gives the 
company‟s service value.157    
The opening paragraph of article one of the GATS defines the four modes of supply in the Trade 
Sector Service. These four modes of supply are defined in line with the location of the provider 
and recipient of the service in question. The liberalisation process of each of the modes is said to 
open a variety of opportunities and challenges irrespective of the fact that the modes are not 
mutually exclusive.
158
 
From the above case study, the DHL Company is categorised under mode three of the GATS 
schedule, which in a way would provide satisfactory service to the recipient, once there is a 
commercial presence in the country entailing market access and presence as in the case of 
Cameroon irrespective of natural persons. Broadly speaking, the service provided by DHL in 
Cameroon is efficient despite the lack of roads and other infrastructures eminent in the country 
because the production capacity of this company is not attached to the developmental condition 
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of the country hosting it. This justifies the high cost paid for the service rendered especially in 
Cameroon. 
 
4.3.1 An Analysis of MTNs Presence in Cameroon 
 
 On the other hand the MTN service in Cameroon would be categorised under mode four of the 
GATS schedule. Mode four signifies the presence of natural persons independent of commercial 
presence.
159
 
The justification of the above classification is the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of the recipients 
of the services provided by the above companies with regard to the mode of supply and the 
company in question. According to the mode three which defines commercial presence only, the 
DHL Company in Cameroon is doing well because the physical presence of the company is not 
necessary for the company to supply its services. The commercial presence alone suffices for this 
company to provide its services as long as market access is involved. 
Mode 3 of the GATS is effectively applicable in the case of DHL operating in Cameroon in the 
sense that this is a German company which has established commercial presence in Cameroon. It 
is jointly owned by these three founding members of German origin who are co-directors. 
However, management is sub-contracted in the hands of local experts in the field who manage 
the day to day running of the business.
160
   
The latter involves dissatisfaction as to the poor performance of services rendered by the MTN 
Company in Cameroon due to the fact that, the presence of natural persons is involved. These 
cross border supply of service is received with dissatisfaction by the receiver because of the poor 
infrastructure and poor implementation of good governance policies of the country which gives 
an unbalanced blend as the Company directors would not come for telephonic service and take 
on infrastructural services in order to make provision for the intended communication services.  
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Determined to stretch to other parts of Africa, however and maintain its position as the number 
one provider of telecommunication services, MTN started improving on infrastructural facilities 
in all other countries of Africa in which they operate in 1997.
161
 According to one of the most 
recent statistics carried out, MTN currently operates in 21 African countries
162
 totaling a 
subscriber‟s base of 14.3million in SA and 2.9million in the rest of Africa.163 The MTN arrived 
Cameroon however in February 2000.
164
 
The challenges faced by MTN operators in Cameroon are quite enormous taking into 
consideration the very poor state of infrastructure evident in the country. Operating in a country 
such as this would kill the Corporations vision of being the leader in telecommunications in 
emerging markets.
165
 Rather than work towards the achievement of this goal funds would have to 
be re-directed towards building infrastructures if this vision has to be maintained. The fact that 
MTN has survived in Cameroon as far back as 2000 means that they have accepted the risk of 
doing business in this country and accepted the effects that goes along with it. This obviously is 
the extra cost and settling with the fact that the services offered cannot be as effective as those 
offered in other African countries like Gabon with average infrastructure. 
166
 
One major problem facing MTN in Cameroon like all other MNCs operating in the country is 
bureaucracy and red tape.   
 
Before establishing its branch in Cameroon the MTN directors took 365 days to obtain the phone 
connection which is the normal time for this to be done because of its poor infrastructure. The 
cost of this is obviously more expensive than would be the case if the same installments had to 
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be done in a country with fairly good infrastructure.
167
 In Cameroon the MTN operators would 
incur more cost to get a telephone landline coupled with the very low and inconsistent electrical 
situation of the country which takes up to 90 working days to get it installed and connected. 
After these there are frequent blackouts and brown outs registered even in urban areas including 
the two major cities; Yaoundé and Douala.
168
 MTN Cameroon therefore operate under acute 
shortage of power even after taking such a long time as seen above to get located in the country. 
This is evidently frustrating and limits prospects of expanding the business. This is coupled with 
the fact that MTN Cameroon further faces the problem of negative growth as the population 
because of the high rate of unemployment and poverty in turn make very slow and timid 
purchases. The possibility of expansion is further limited by slow turn over even if the desire to 
expand is there. 
 
Foreign firms wishing to open a branch in Cameroon may apply for authorization to 
the Ministry of Economy and Plan. The firm must submit certified copies of its 
articles of incorporation, a description of the firm's past and present activities, and its 
business objectives in Cameroon. If the Ministry of Economy and Plan approves the 
firm's request, it will issue a decree authorizing the establishment of a branch. This 
procedure is time consuming, complicated, rarely used, and not encouraged by the 
government.
169
 
 
These are legal procedures for establishing a business in the country, but as can be inferred from 
above the government does not encourage it. Private investors in this case are made to believe 
that the government is far from being committed to its laws and therefore acts in bad faith. This 
consequently brings the foreign investor to be less committed to its engagements. In this 
instance, MNCs are faced with the problem of institutional uncertainty. The effect of this is that 
they run the risk of losing their investments with no backing of accountability.
170
  
This chapter continues to look at the frame work under which MNCs like the DHL and MTN 
operate in Cameroon. The regulatory frame work is equally juxtaposed and uncertain. The weak 
                                                          
167
 Emilie C, Kinfack D and  Oludele A „ Regulation, SME Performance and Growth in Cameroon's manufacturing 
and retail sectors‟ Investment Climate and Business Environment Research Fund. Trust Africa. Dakar November 
2011. Available at http://www.trustafrica.org/documents/Case%20Studies%202012/Kinfack-edited.pdf  (accessed 
17 April 2012) 
168
 Nchelatebe D, Mervyn  S, and Thong V, „et AL‟ „Electricity supply, irregularities, and the prospect for solar 
energy and energy sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa‟ (2010) 2 Journal of Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
023102  16 
169 Duane S „The Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Cameroon‟ (1983) 17 International Lawyer  489 506 
170
 Godfred A, Sikod F „Investment Legislation in Cameroon‟ Decentralisation: Finance and Management Project 
March 1994 available at  http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABR907.pdf  (accessed 20 April 2012) 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
judicial system and numerous regulators can be accountable for this. Foreign investors are 
hereby faced with the problem of choice as to which regulatory procedure is credible to choose 
from due to the presence of numerous regulators which at the final analysis become confusing. 
Amongst the other problems encountered by MNCs operating in Cameroon in general and MTN 
in particular, the problem of a poor judicial system also plays greatly on the output of their 
services. Writers like Nchelatebe D, Mervyn  S, and Thong V, „et AL‟ infer that, institutional 
and administrative loop holes of the legal system and of the judiciary will hamper the proper and 
swift execution of commercial and financial contracts. The judicial system in Cameroon 
generally known to be weak gives lack of confidence in the judicial system for this institution to 
uphold property rights which creates a huge impediment for the foreign investor‟s investment 
plans and strategy. This makes the investors security questionable. This brings to light the 
problem of insecurity faced by MNCs in Cameroon. 
 
4.3.2 Evaluating the Measure of DHL’s Presence in Cameroon 
 
The South African Firm, MTN based in Cameroon for almost 2decades today is yet to gain 
national recognition. Unlike the DHL which provides services in all the parts of the 
country, MTN concentrates on billboards advertising mainly in the economic capital of the 
country,
171
 and so do not provide services that meet up with the customer‟s expectation 
like DHL does.
172
  The MTN‟s network is under pressure due to the problem of 
infrastructure, tis gives the reason why it is based mostly in Douala and Yaoundé, that is 2 
of the ten regions of the country which gives a difficult interconnection problem to the 8 
remaining regions of the country where accessibility is rather difficult, and even then 
another huge obstacle is the problem of electricity as seen above. Thus its supply chain is 
greatly limited as it is absent in most parts of the country or its efficiency greatly 
handicapped. 
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4.4 Aspects of Legal Deterrent to foreign investors 
 
The Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) has described the paradox: 
countries fight for investment, but “when someone has finally made the decision to 
invest, he then is subjected to some of the worst treatment imaginable. “Such barriers 
to entry condemn millions of entrepreneurs to the informal or gray economies, reduce 
investment and trade across borders, and diminish competition that would increase 
consumer welfare and household income in poor countries.
173
 
 
The above paradox can be seen from two angles. In the first instance, a country like Cameroon 
for example in quest of attracting FDI, promulgated laws that are appealing to foreign investors 
to invest in the country, while at the same time rendering this same laws meant to attract these 
investors difficult to practically implement. The second paradox can be seen from the point that 
these barriers are most often legalized, as traces of these deterrents to be examined below can be 
traced from the first investment code in 1960 up to the current 2002 investment charter 
governing investment decisions in the country. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
these investment laws are meant to attract foreign investors and not to repeal them. Policy 
makers must therefore be conscious of these negative spill overs of FDI and make room for them 
when designing policies to attract and regulate foreign investments.
174
 As in the case of 
Cameroon, policy makers should be balanced, so as not to over tax foreign investors or let the 
rules be too liberal on foreign investors in such a way as to sap the law of its very purpose. Tax 
policies for example should be fair and balanced. These possible deterrent factors present in 
Cameroon‟s investment policies are cited by Ndiva K, who says under Cameroon‟s General Tax 
Code, foreign enterprises are unduly exempted from corporate taxes for two years. The author 
further certifies that the investment codes of Cameroon further impose fewer restrictions on 
access to foreign exchange when compared to that of other countries in Africa like Kenya.
175
 
The ground work for this liberal legal framework for FDI in the Cameroon investment code was 
laid after the creation of an Industrial Free Zone (IFZ or free trade zone) and later promulgated 
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into law in 1990, followed by the promulgation of a new investment code in November 1990. 
This code‟s overriding objective was the encouragement and promotion of productive 
investments in the country through liberalisation of the economy.
176
 These encouragements came 
in the form of incentives as explained in the paragraph below. 
 These incentives which were meant to attract private investors ended up having them repealed 
from the country for reason of being attractive only on paper. In reality corruption and 
mismanagement robs the authentic application of these laws. Inclusive in this code are 14 basic 
guarantees to both domestic and foreign investors. These include ownership and the right to 
foreign investors to repatriate capital and income. The said code
177
also includes the Investment 
Code Management Unit (ICMU), which is a „one- stop- shop „policy for investment approval 
and dispute resolution. This one-stop shop meant to be an incentive for investment in Cameroon 
gradually took the place of barrier against investment in Cameroon like in other African 
countries. In spite of these attractive incentives incorporated in the investment code few foreign 
investors have been attracted to invest in the country because of the corruptive nature of the 
country‟s investment policies underneath this code.178 The paradox here is that these “one stop 
shops” established by many other countries in Africa apart from Cameroon to ease the 
bureaucracies involved in investment have fallen short of obtaining the intended results. Not only 
have policy makers in Africa as a whole and Cameroon in particular been unable to attract 
private investors through the one stop shop facility, they are not effective as they do not help to 
simplify regulation procedures in investment. In the absence of regulating investment, private 
investors are thus deterred from investing and thus investment is deregulated rather than being 
regulated. In other parts of the African continent apart from Cameroon, the concept of the one-
stop shop facility meant to be regulating investment has become a channel through which 
deregulation has become a reality. 
Many developing countries have established or endeavoured to establish one-stop 
shop for investors as part of their enhanced investment policy and have been 
disillusioned by the results. In Uganda for example, the World Bank‟s Operations 
Evaluation Department concluded in 2001 that „the Bank‟s concept that the Uganda 
Investment Authority would be a one-stop shop to meet all of a new investor‟s 
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needs for permits, licenses, and service connections was flawed.‟179  
 
Above is a glimpse of the contradictory results obtained from the one-stop workshop in Uganda 
as evaluated by the World Bank‟s representative in this country.  
Mali has also experienced failure in the one stop shop policy as per the findings of UNCTAD 
following reports in 2007.  Many African countries coming up with the one-stop shop facility 
have failed to improve on regulations by swiftly patronising demands from investors, and 
implementing what is incorporated in the code.
180
  
According to Touna Mama and Schouame aspects of deregulation policy started propping up in 
Cameroon‟s Economic policy from the mid- 1980s.  This means that from the 1960s when 
Cameroon enacted its first investment code up to the 1980s investment regulation policies in 
Cameroon‟s political history were stable. The writers note that the origin of deregulation in the 
economic crisis of the second half of the 1980s manifested in two spectacular ways; first the 
external shocks on the one hand and secondly the inefficient implementation of domestic 
economic policies on the other hand. The writers explicitly consider devaluation as a 
deregulation policy or implicitly as a point of departure for new deregulatory measures.
181
 
Devaluation is implicitly considered a point of departure for new regulatory measures because 
the devaluation process for instance in Cameroon led to the privatization of many corporations 
like the SONEL (Societe Nationale D‟eletricite) to the American AES who had come Cameroon 
at the President‟s agreement to privatization in the late 1980s has led Cameron with far more 
frequent black outs than used to be the case when it was under the state.
182
 
Another major legal deterrent against foreign investors investing in Cameroon is the 
centralization of power by the executive headed by the president of the Republic who is 
answerable to nobody.
183
 This acts as a deterrent to investors as there is no accountability and 
transparency which leads to investment decisions individually taken regardless of the interest of 
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the investor as long as it is to the interest of a few top officials.
184
 The judiciary and legislature is 
dependent on the executive headed by the head of state from whom all decisions originate.  
This is where the main aspect of legal deterrent to foreign investors in Cameroon originates. The fact 
that there are no checks and balances is a main cause for concern to the potential private investor 
who in the case of an investment dispute arising from his engagements in the country would have to 
face a powerful executive who can change laws and enforcement at will without giving account to 
either the legislature or the judiciary. This being the case the investor would have no option but to 
leave the country or refer to courts of higher authority. This would definitely entail extra expenditure 
in the face of an already pending loss.185  
Deregulation of the legal framework that controls FDI have been known to legally deter foreign 
investors from investing in Cameroon as seen below. Policy makers realising the effect this holds 
on the flow of FDI have attempted to salvage the situation by instituting tax deductions and tax 
holidays and other incentives to attract private investors invest in the country. The proceeding 
chapter would unveil if these efforts have had a positive or negative impact in terms of attracting 
foreign investors in the country 
Deregulating the legal frame work that governs investment in Cameroon legally deters investors 
from investing in Cameroon. In order to make up for this deregulation policies, as seen in the 
case of the one-stop shops, policy makers came up with incentives in the form of tax reduction 
and others to re-attract investors in the country. 
Private investors invest to make profits and not for reasons of benevolence. Thus, if 
they make profits they expect, albeit not unnaturally, to keep them, subject to payment 
of appropriate taxes to the local authorities; if they acquire property, they expect to be 
entitled to keep it. The feeling of insecurity in these respects is, perhaps, the major 
deterrent to the flow of direct foreign investment in less-developed countries 
(LDC).
186
 
 
The Cameroonian government in this regard has proved itself unworthy of trust. Though the 
Cameroon investment code provides for repatriation of profit to the investor‟s home country, 
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there are doubts surrounding the veracity of this policy due to the fact that the guarantees to the 
execution of this policy and others depends on the benevolence of the executive. Private 
investors deem that if an authoritarian executive executes a law there is no certainty that the law 
would be enforced. Investors need a credible and trustworthy commitment through unforeseen 
strategies to resolve impromptu matters which is absent
187
   
Cameroon has gone through many strategic and constitutional changes since 1960 when it 
attained independence, which have been depicted in the different steps provided for ensuring the 
constitutionality of laws.
188
   
One other significant deterrent to the flow of FDI to Cameroon is the bilingual nature of the 
country, which means a conflict of the common law and civil law rules, depicting disagreement 
within the constitutional system. Private investors would in this case doubt the neutrality and 
independence of the prevailing rule upheld by the constitution. With such a tense atmosphere 
prevalent in the country, private investors cannot be encouraged to invest in the country as it 
exhibits a weak and inconsistent rule of law dangerous to investment in the face of FDI 
disputes.
189
 
Corruption has been widely acknowledged to be a deterrent force to FDI. Corruption described 
as the abuse of public power for private gain is argued to have a positive and negative effect.
190
 
For the purpose of this research I strongly argue that there should be no positive side to 
corruption particularly for a small and underdeveloped country like Cameroon. This means that 
those involved in the practice of corruption should be held accountable as is the case in 
Cameroon where government officials are being tried and imprisoned.  
With low salaries and high cost of living, private enrichment at public cost has become a routine 
in Cameroon; Corruption is embedded at all levels of government.
191
 The top officials who 
should promote transparency and accountability are the ones more involved in the act of 
                                                          
187
 Godfred A, Sikod F „Investment Legislation in Cameroon‟ Decentralisation: Finance and Management Project 
March 1994 available at  http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABR907.pdf  (accessed 30 April 2012) 
188
 Fombad C „The New Cameroonian Constitutional Council in a Comparative Perspective: Progress or 
Retrogression? (1998) 42 Journal of African Law 172 86 
189
 Kamanga B The  Role of Governance in using Project Finance as a Contract for the Delivery of Infrastructure in 
Africa (LLM thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2008) 40 
190Alvaro C „Who Cares About Corruption‟ (2006) 37 Journal of International Business Studies 807 22  
191Jurg M „Cameroon‟s Neopatrimonial Dilemma‟ (1999) 17 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 173-97 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
corruption thus the act cannot be brought to question. This deters private investors from 
investing in the country. 
From the 2008 Transparency International records, Cameroon was identified as one of the most 
corrupt countries in Africa, rated the 141
st
 out of the 180 countries on which statistics were 
carried out in the corruption transparency index. This would naturally bring the private investors 
looking for more assuring and convincing reasons to invest in the country. In the case where they 
decide despite all odds because of the country‟s rich and natural vegetation they encounter the 
problem of bureaucracy which only goes further to discourage investors. In this regard, an 
average business takes 426 days complying with license and permits requirement almost twice 
the average for an African nation. Cameroon ranks 160 out of 178 countries on the World Banks 
starting a business index
192
  
Road construction was given the highest priority in the country‟s five years development plan.193 
 
4.5 Possible solutions to the problems deterring foreign investment 
  
Solutions to the problems affecting investment in Cameroon can be brought about only by the 
country itself as Private investors can only intervene. This phase of the research concerns 
solutions to the problems deterring foreign investors from investing in Cameroon. These 
problems will ultimately be dealt with by Cameroon policy makers vis à vis the problems 
encountered by foreign investors, and the determination of these foreign investors to carry on 
investment projects amidst that which they cannot change. Cameroon‟s share of FDI flows has 
not only deteriorated remarkably in recent years, but compared to other countries from the SSA 
region has always been below average level. This underperformance in attracting FD can be 
resolved with an attempt of the solutions suggested below. Primarily Cameroon must diversify 
its commercial products so as to attract a variety of investors in the country and work at 
improving it infrastructure. Another main solution to problems deterring investors from investing 
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in Cameroon would be restrained from breaching contracts. In Cameroon foreign investors have 
included investing in risk in their investment programme in Cameroon. Reduction in taxation and 
good governance policies and accountability are all solutions put forward by the Cameroon 
government to include the flow of FDI in the country.
194
   
To solve the institutional problem inherent in the investment code, the government has come up 
with an investment programme in the infrastructure sector. This is especially to meet the 
country‟s growing energy needs which is one of the reasons MNCs cannot function properly and 
so discourage potential investors from building industries in the country. In this regard an energy 
strategy has been devised and is been progressively monitored. Plans for construction work on 
Kribi‟s195 deep-water port are underway. Investors from Europe, Chinese and Canada met 
together in this regard in May of 2008 to raise the US$ 6.55 million in regards to the project. 
Highlights of the project are exploitation of cobalt, diamond, nickel and uranium reserves.
196
 
 A further solution to the unnecessary bureaucracy involved in setting up businesses is the 
streamlining of procedures for starting business. As concerns the percentage of taxes to be paid 
by investors, the situation has been addressed and requires that tax procedures entail carrying out 
an in-depth review of the relevant statutory and regulating instruments on the one hand, and 
instituting in conjunction with centralised local authorities. The review of legal instruments was 
expected to start in 2009 by reducing by half the number of tax return slips and end latest in 2012 
with the harmonisation of various instruments and ensuring their compliance with International 
Labor standard
197
 
The last practical solution to the problem of the underperformance of FDI in Cameroon is that 
foreign investors who are faced with the enormous challenge of investing in a country with poor 
infrastructure than the local investors formulate imaginative strategies to counter infrastructural, 
political and institutional handicaps that they would encounter before engaging fully into 
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investing. When this is done the problems they eventual face would be met with a handy 
solution.
198
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The Chapter has been a review of how MNCs survive in Cameroon and out of Cameroon. From 
there an investigation was made on problems typical of the Cameroonian society that affects 
MNCs established in the country. A minor comparism has further been carried out in this 
chapter, exposing the reason why one MNC operates successfully in Cameroon while the other 
does not, though operating in the same country and under the same institutional conditions. This 
is followed by some aspects of legal deterrent to investors predominant not only in Cameroon, 
but also in other African countries.  Detailed analysis DHL has a positive impact because it 
doesn‟t need to be present to perform positively unlike the MTN which needs to be present to 
survive. I have proposed possible solutions to the problem of the very timid flow of FDI 
experienced by the country in particular and the African continent at large. 
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Chapter Five 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
5.1 Recommendations 
The investment climate of every country is regulated by that country‟s investment code, if the 
investment flow in the country does not correspond to the abundance of natural resources evident 
especially for a country like Cameroon popularly called „Africa in miniature‟ because of its rich 
geological and natural diversity, then further amendments of the current investment code has to 
be made if that has been done already as is the case in Cameroon.
199
 Blessed with a rich variety 
of natural resources including petroleum minerals and other cash crops like rubber coffee cocoa 
cotton and palm oil and many others, Cameroon still live in misery
200
 because potential investors 
shy away from investing in Cameroon because of the poor institutionalization of its investment 
policies. 
The findings from this work proves however that, the investment climate in Cameroon as well as 
other African countries is influenced to a great extent by other factors as well as the government 
establishing rigorous and credible investment regulations, unlike has been the case from 1960 
when it established the first investment code right through to the current 2002 investment 
charter. A new and firm commitment has to absolutely to spring forth from the current 2002 
investment charter. The reason for this being that regardless of the number of times investment 
codes have been revised and implemented, the country is yet to record a remarkable FDI flow 
unlike the case with other countries in the same sub-region with lesser advantage in terms of 
population and political stability and possession of rich natural resources and food crops like 
Cameroon.
201
  
As recommendation therefore, in view of the problems hindering foreign investment in the 
country as seen in previous chapters of this work, the purpose of the present is to highlights key 
areas that Cameroon policy makers should put in place to not only attract FDI flow in the 
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country, but be competitive in today‟s globalised world to attract and preserve FDI in the 
country. These comprises  
 making provision for, and respecting relevant incentives 
 Adopting and enforcing a zero tolerance approach towards corruption 
 Investing in the much needed infrastructure 
 Creating a conducive investment friendly environment  
 Opening workshops and synthesising the population on the need to open the country 
through trade  
 Revision of tax policies 
 Constant review of its investment policies 
 Worthy of attention is the need to swiftly implement the investment codes immediately after its 
promulgation. For the sake of credibility, investors would seriously consider investing in the 
country only after this has been dealt with. The message sent out is „we can only take you serious 
if you take yourselves seriously‟. The Cameroon Investment charter for example was passed in 
2002 but implementation delayed. Not only is the charter yet to be completely implemented but 
the president signed a decree in May 2009 postponing the deadline implementation of some 
provisions to this charter to 2014.
202
 It is but logical not to expect investors to stake their 
investments in a country with such bureaucracy and laxity looming in the „supposed‟ legal sector 
prone to govern issues of investment. I would in this case recommend necessary arrangements 
for implementation of investment laws before it is passed so as to enable its swift 
implementation once it is passed. This would cancel the negative impression foreign investors 
have in regards to enforcement of laws in Cameroon and thereby re-attract them into the country. 
As concerns the prevalent authoritative and corrupt situation facing the country, investors would 
be encouraged to invest in the country if, the judiciary and legislative is not subdued by the 
executive.  This means that the judiciary and legislative need to be strong and independent and 
reserve the right to be consulted and given account of decisions taken by the executive. This 
together with red tape measures are crucial problems facing Cameroon which if the government 
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takes measures to deal with would give foreign investors more confidence and assurance to 
invest in the country. It would therefore be imperative for the government to amend this loop 
hole and faithfully commit itself to redress the situation so as to re-install the lost confidence on 
the part foreign investors towards the Cameroonian population. 
The Cameroon government further needs to understand that a systematic war has to be launched 
against corruption and misappropriation of fund in order for the business climate to be 
transparent and trust worthy.  
 
5.2 Conclusion  
 
This study observed that the Cameroon investment code is ripped with many flaws, primarily the 
code completely ignores the fact that, objectively, some investments would only benefit from its 
incentives only after several years of their establishment. Looking at the 1960 code for example 
which was based primarily on the primary industry, enough time was not given to wait for the 
outcome of its realisation. Added to this, was the fact that there was no real anticipation to 
welcome foreign investors, as this was a period marked by nationalism. In anticipation for a 
peaceful growth and technical development of its economy, Cameroon became a member of 
World organisations and several other regional and economic organisations.  
Furthermore, this study observed, the concept of FDI from a universal, regional and 
Cameroonian perspective. This was closely followed by the regulation of the concept by 
Cameroon policy makers. From the Cameroonian perspective, this was carefully analysed by 
detailing looking at the regulation of the various codes the country has adopted from when it 
gained independence in 1960 right through to the current investment code dubbed the 2002 
investment charter. After this the importance of FDI on the growth of the economy was 
examined. 
In line with the objective of this work, Cameroon as an individual nation qualifies for MFN 
treatment on all its investment and economic transactions from other member countries due to its 
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membership in the WTO.
203
 In the same light the study reveals that its membership in regional 
organisations like the CEMAC and OHADA gave its much benefit and unlimited access to 
markets for goods and services from its rich supply of food crops especially to CEMAC 
members like Gabon where it remains the main supplier.
204
  
The study posits an appraisal of MNCs in Cameroon carried out on a platform of two foreign 
MNCs resident in Cameroon by comparing their performance, and exploring the reason for one 
succeeding and the other not succeeding. It was realised that Gabon has more favorable 
investment policies than Cameroon, hence the reason for its high performance in attracting 
foreign investors than Cameroon.  
The series of modifications in Cameroon‟s investment codes have been carried out without an 
institutional plan to support application and enforcement of the code, which has been repugnant 
to the investor. The codes have been marked by too much uncertainty as it is seen to have been 
updated three times and irregularities suppressed, while incentives provided as in the 1984 code 
under the IFZ regime and the 1990 and 2002 did not bring about the expected positive FDI flows 
in the country. Thus it has been observed that signing a piece of paper has not solved the 
problem of under investment in Cameroon. Investors have a negative picture of policy makers in 
Cameroon as it is believed the government is not committed to what is signed on paper.
205
   
Apart from this, is the poor governance system prevalent in the country, with a very strong 
unchallengeable executive, instead of the three balancing powers; executive, judiciary and 
legislative. The executive is accountable to no one, and can change decrees and laws as it suits 
its interest. This is the main cause of institutional uncertainty as there are no checks and 
balances. This leaves the investors and potential investors with a negative impact as their only 
                                                          
203Sudip R „Does WTO accession affect domestic economic policies and institutions?‟ Graduate Institute of 
International Studies March 2008 available at 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/international_economics/shared/international_economics/publications/worki
ng%20papers/2008/HEIWP03-2008.pdf  (accessed 6 May 2012) 
204
African Development Bank ‘African Economic Outlook’ (2008) 
205
Godfred A, Sikod F „Investment Legislation in Cameroon‟ Decentralisation: Finance and Management Project 
March 1994 available at  http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABR907.pdf  (accessed 30 April 2012)  
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reaction would be to try to join the private sector or leave the country as has been the case with 
some companies. 
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